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[I]t is impossible to consider seriously the vital elements of a
fair trial without concluding that it is the duty of the judge, and
the judge alone, as the sole representativeof the public interest,
to step in at any stage of the litigation where his intervention is
necessary in the interests of justice.'
I.

INTRODUCTION

To further the end that no man be denied justice, modern procedural reforms have emphasized the simplification of pleadings
and the expansion of pretrial discovery. 2 Although these reforms
generally are lauded as advancing the public policy favoring free
access to the courts, they have opened the door to substantial
abuse of the litigation process.' Observing the pernicious effects of
unbridled discovery in the hands of lawyers, Justice Powell has
noted that "[1]awyers devote an enormous number of 'chargeable
hours' to the practice of discovery. . . all too often . . . enabling
the party with greater financial resources to prevail by exhausting
the resources of a weaker opponent. '4 Clients may exacerbate this
'Kaufman, The Philosophy of Effective Judicial Supervision Over Litigation, 29
F.R.D. 207, 216 (1961).
2 See M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 112-13, 141 (2d ed. 1979); 4 J. MOORE, Fu26.00[4] (2d ed. 1982). One commentator has noted that the proper function of a system of civil procedure is to provide "a mechanism of investigation where there is
a reasonable suspicion of legal wrong," thereby preventing the "wolves" from hiding "among
the sheep." Risinger, Honesty in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REv. 1, 56 (1976). This investigatory
function has become increasingly more important in today's world of modern technology
which permits "actionable conduct to be secretly undertaken and easily concealed." Id. at
57.
3 Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). The Supreme
Court has recognized that although liberalized discovery rules may produce relevant evidence necessary to determine the merits of a claim, they also allow a litigant with an essentially meritless claim to waste time and judicial machinery through excessive depositions
and document production. Id. This latter aspect of liberalized discovery is a "social cost
rather than a benefit." Id. Similarly, it has been noted that the federal pleading rules allow
opposing parties "to inflict punitive expenses on each other in interminable discovery wars."
Aldisert, State Courts and Federalism in the 1980's: Comment, 22 WM.& MARY L. REV.
821, 841 (1981).
" Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Powell,
J., dissenting). Many litigants are forced to abandon legitimate claims or settle illegitimate
ones simply because of the unreasonably high litigation costs. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell observed that the mere threat of delay and its consequential expense may
operate to deprive litigants of comparatively limited means of their day in court, thus
"cast[ing] a lengthening shadow over the basic fairness of our legal system." Id. (Powell, J.,
dissenting); see Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under the Federal
Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 121, 126-34 (1949). See also 4 J. MOORE,supra note 2, 26.02[3], at
ERAL PRACTICE

1982]

CURBING LITIGATION ABUSES

abuse, often entering the fray of litigation indifferent to the burdens it may impose on others. Not surprisingly, cases arise in
which neither the plaintiff nor his counsel has reasonable grounds
for initiating the litigation, but have proceeded simply in the hope
5
that some basis for suit may materialize during discovery. Similarly, defendants often succumb to the temptations of liberal
pleading and discovery rules, asserting sham defenses and counterclaims, and filing flurries of motions in the hope of discouraging
the plaintiff and delaying a judgment."

For the most part, courts have eschewed any role in these pretrial adversarial battles.7 Indeed, the Federal Rules of Civil Proce26-68 ("expensive depositions can be used for 'shake-down purposes' by plaintiffs who have
no intention of pursuing their suits through to trial").
' Renfrew, Discovery Sanctions: A Judicial Perspective, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 264, 266
(1979); see, e.g., Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 233 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1977); Cohen v.
Illinois Inst. of Technology, 524 F.2d 818, 827 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943
(1976); American Communications Ass'n, Local 10 v. Retirement Plan for Employees of
RCA Corp. and Subsidiary Cos., 488 F. Supp. 479, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 239, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (Ct. App. 1976); Norton v.
Hines, 49 Cal. App. 3d 917, 919, 123 Cal. Rptr. 237, 238 (Ct. App. 1975).
6 See, e.g., In re National Student Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 729-31 (D.D.C. 1978).
See also Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 214-15 (1981) [hereinafter cited as ACTL Recommendations]. The ACTL has observed:
[B]oth the increased expense and increased delay [of litigation] are primarily responsible for another of the harmful side effects caused by massive discovery: the
invitation for the filing of "strike suits"--meritless cases started for the sole purpose of harassing defendants and forcing them to "buy off" the plaintiffs by offering in settlement an amount somewhat less than the inordinate cost of full-fledged
litigation. Of course, the greater the opportunity for unchecked discovery before a
final disposition, the more easily such a plaintiff will be able to force early settlement. Just as easily may defendants faced with a likely judgment against them
"outflank" their often less financially resourceful opponents by overwhelming
them with burdensome discovery. Certainly the interests of justice are not furthered by either of these results.
ACTL Recommendations, supra, at 214-15 (footnote omitted). But see Lowe's of Roanoke,
Inc. v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 181, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (liberal discovery policy acts as an "'effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and
sham claims and defenses' ") (quoting 4 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.02[2], at 1035).
7 Chief Judge Peckham of the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California recently commented:
Traditionally, judges have been depicted solely as dispensers of justice, weighing opposing evidence and legal arguments on their finely-calibrated scales to
mete out rewards and punishments. Until quite recently the trial judge played
virtually no role in a case until counsel for at least one side certified that it was
ready for trial.
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a Case from
Filing to Disposition,69 CALIF. L. REv. 770, 770 (1981).
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dure specifically contemplate minimal judicial intervention at the
discovery stage.8 Consequently, counsel are free to file "shotgun"
complaints,9 to assert and explore all conceivable claims and defenses-to leave no stone unturned during discovery.10 The crushing burden on litigants and the courts which results when this system is exploited frequently culminates in a denial of justice.'
In response to the flood of unchecked litigation abuse, intense
pressures currently are being exerted on the legal profession for
procedural and ethical reform. One manifestation of this is the
proliferation of malicious prosecution actions against trial counsel. 2 Within the profession, an American Bar Association (ABA)
committee has labored to secure approval of a comprehensive revision of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 8 including certain
model rules specifically addressed to counsel's duty to expedite litigation 4 and refrain from vexatious conduct.' 5 Additionally, the JuSee Kaufman, Judicial Control Over Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 116 (1960). Judge
Kaufman has observed that "[t]he whole discovery procedure contemplates an absence of
judicial intervention in the run-of-the-mill discovery attempt." Id.; see, e.g., Cotton v.
Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1332 (5th Cir. 1977); In re Armored Car Antitrust Litig., 472 F.
Supp. 1357, 1369 n.11 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
" The "shotgun" complaint names as defendants every person or institution having any
connection with the transaction in suit whether or not there is any reasonable basis for
joinder at the time of filing. Singer & Giampietro, The Countersuit, 6 LITIGATION 18, 20
(Fall 1979); see, e.g., Kadar Corp. v. Milbury, 549 F.2d 230, 232 (1st Cir. 1977).
10 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); see Amendments
to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000-01 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting);
Aldisert, supra note 3, at 841. One commentator has suggested that fear of malpractice
charges also may be a significant motivating factor for an attorney's conducting overly extensive discovery. See Smith, The Concern Over Discovery, 28 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 51 n.1
(1978-1979); accord, Barthold, 'Negligence' in Discovery: No Paper Tiger, 6 LITIGATION 39,
39-40 (Fall 1979). See also Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its

PrincipalProblems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B.

FOUNDATION RESEARCH

J. 789, 840.

Lasker, The Court Crunch: A View from the Bench, 76 F.R.D. 245, 250 (1977); 4 J.
MOORE, supra note 2, 1 26.02[5]. For an interesting case illustrating judicial frustration with
the current rules, see Brown v. Cameron-Brown Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1181 (E.D. Va.
1980), rev'd, 31 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1981), in which the trial judge relied on rule
83 to dismiss a complaint that survived attacks under rules 11, 12 and 56. The judge reasoned that notwithstanding compliance with all the rules, when any possibility of legitimate
benefit is substantially outweighed by the costs "we are not dealing with a lawsuit....
[but] instead, intended or not, with a 'heist."' Id. at 1198. See also Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 457 (3d Cir. 1977) (Aldisert, J., dissenting).
12 Zilly, Recent Developments in Legal MalpracticeLitigation, 6 LITIGATION 8, 12 (Fall
1979).
13 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Final Draft 1982)
[hereinafter cited as
2

FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES].
14
1"

See id., Rule 3.2.
See id., Rules 3.1, 3.4.
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dicial Conference of the United States has adopted yet another set
of proposals for amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
aimed at curbing abuses in pleading, motion practice and
discovery.16
This Article addresses the effectiveness of these recent developments and proposals, and discusses them in the context of recent opinions illustrating the power of the trial judge to control the
excesses of the adversary system. It rejects the countersuit as a
time-consuming and costly means of controlling litigation abuses,
and concludes that "tinkering changes"' 7 in the rules of procedure
cannot bring about true reform. It is urged here that the burden
resulting from abuse of litigation can only be relieved by changes
which foster stronger judicial control of adversarial ethics, and
greater judicial involvement in the pretrial stages of litigation. 8
Any proposed change or reform, therefore, is evaluated from the
perspective of whether the change will encourage trial judges to act
resolutely in sanctioning errant counsel, without simultaneously
producing a chilling effect on zealous advocacy.
II.

A.

GROUNDLESS LITIGATION

The Rise and Demise of Attorney Immunity from Countersuit

Postlitigation countersuits traditionally have been considered
antithetical to the public policy that all persons be afforded free

Is See U.S. JUD. CONF., PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO TE FEDERAL RULES OF CiVL

PRocE-

DURE (1982) [hereinafter cited as FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE] (adopting as amended COMM. ON RUrs OF PRAC. AND PROC., U.S. Jun.
CONF., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1981) [hereinafter cited as 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF

CIVIL PROCEDURE]), reported in Nat'l L.J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 13.
17 446 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell considered the 1980 amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4, 5, 26, 28, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37 and 45 to be mere
"tinkering changes" that would only serve to "delay for years the adoption of genuinely
effective reforms." 446 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting); see Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse,
7 LITIGATION 8, 10 (Spring 1981).
Is See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176-77 (1979); id. at 180 (Powell, J., concurring);
ACF Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1087 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting for denial of
certiorari). In his speech before the American Bar Association, Chief Justice Burger stated,
"[w]here existing rules and statutes permit abuse, they must be changed. Where the power
lies with judges to prevent or correct abuse and misuse of the system, judges must act."
Burger, Annual Report on the State of the Judiciary-1980,66 A.B.A. J. 295, 296 (1980);
see, Brazil, supra note 10, at 862-69; Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 10; cf. Chagnon v. Bell,
642 F.2d 1248, 1266 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (in suits against the government, close judicial control
of discovery is essential to preserve immunity of governmental officials).
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and unfettered access to the courts. At early common law, an absolute immunity was extended to protect all litigating parties from
subsequent liability for defamatory statements published during
the course of judicial proceedings. 19 Because fear of countersuits
for defamation might deter the litigant from fully pressing his
claim, the suits were not to be entertained. 0 Similarly, because of
the potentially inhibiting effect of malicious prosecution actions,
many courts have limited them to circumstances where an actual
arrest or seizure of property has taken place. 21 This "English" rule

or "strict view" is based upon a number of beliefs: an award of
costs provides an adequate remedy for any abuse; the judicial process should be free and open to all without fear of being sued in
return; liberal allowance of malicious prosecution actions would
cause endless litigation; and a defendant should not have a right to
countersue since the plaintiff does not have equivalent redress if a
defense is meritless and malicious.22

These immunities were extended to an attorney representing a
client in litigation primarily because the attorney is the client's avenue of access to the courts. It was feared that counsel's natural
inclination to shield himself from future liability to his client's opponent might hamper him in the zealous representation of his client, and prevent him from fulfilling his fiduciary duty of representation with undivided loyalty.2 3 Thus, in his role as advocate, the
attorney has enjoyed a privileged position in the law. Indeed, until
recently, it has been held that the chilling effect of potential thirdparty claims justified counsel's absolute immunity from liability
19

20

See, e.g., The King v. Skinner, 98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K.B. 1772).
Note, Absolute Immunity in Defamation: Judicial Proceedings, 9 COLUM. L. REV.

463, 478 (1909); see, e.g., Petty v. General Accidexit Fire & Life Assurance Corp., 365 F.2d
419, 421 (3d Cir. 1966). The absolute immunity afforded to judges, attorneys, witnesses,
parties and jurors against defamation actions reflected the common-law view that the individual's right to be protected from defamation is outweighed by the public interest in freedom of expression by participants in judicial proceedings. .365 F.2d at 421.
21 Perry v. Arsham, 101 Ohio App. 285, 287, 136 N.E.2d 141, 143 (Ct. App. 1956). In
contrast to the view inhibitive of malicious prosecution actions, the liberal view concerning
countersuits requires only "provable injury," in addition to the other requisites of a malicious prosecution action, namely, that the prior suit was unfounded, maliciously brought,
and terminated in favor of the plaintiff in the countersuit. Id.
22 See, e.g., Skarbinski v. Henry H. Krause Co., 378 F.2d 656, 657-58 (6th Cir. 1967);
Kalso Systemet, Inc. v. Jacobs, 474 F. Supp. 666, 670 n.22 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
2 Note, supra note 20, at 482. One commentator has noted that an attorney is in
greater need of the protection afforded by immunity than his or her client. Id. To subject an
attorney to liability would "fetter and restrain him in the fearless discharge of the duty
which he owes to his client, and which the successful administration of justice demands." Id.
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under any theory, including malicious prosecution.2"
The rule of absolute immunity for the attorney, however, is no
longer talismanic. Courts have grown dissatisfied with the "American "rule which prohibits the assessment of attorney's fees against
an unsuccessful party litigant,2 5 and have recognized the inadequacy of an award of costs.2 6 Moreover, there is a perceived inability or reluctance by the bar to police its ranks through disciplinary
actions.27 Given the inequity inherent in the rule of attorney im-

munity and its purported role in promoting frivolous litigation, the
courts have become more willing to invade the previously immunized world of the advocate. As a result, some courts are now permitting third-party actions against counsel for malicious prosecu2 9 for example,
tion.2 8 In Raine v. Drasin,
the Supreme Court of
24 See, e.g., W.D.G., Inc. v. Mutual Mfg. & Supply Co., 5 Ohio Op. 3d 397, 399-400 (Ct.
App. 1976). The W.D.G. court considered it necessary to afford attorneys absolute immunity
from a third-party action for malicious prosecution so as to ensure that the attorney would
properly represent his client. Id. In another Ohio case, Beacon Journal Publishing Co. v.
Zonak, Poulos & Cain, No. 79 AP-123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979), the plaintiff's trial attorneys
were sued by their client's former opponent after they unsuccessfully attempted to pursue
an action in federal court, allegedly for the sole purpose of obtaining publicity. In an unpublished opinion the state's intermediate appellate court ruled that counsel were absolutely
immune from suit.
25 See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 270 (1975). The
American rule prohibiting an award of attorney's fees is founded on the public policy of
promoting access to the courts. See, e.g., Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co.,
386 U.S. 714, 718 (1967). Describing this rule, Chief Justice Warren noted that litigants
"should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit." Id. He reasoned
that the absence of such a rule would have an adverse impact on the poor, as they "might be
unjustly discouraged from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their opponents' counsel." Id. See also Birnbaum, Physicians Counterattack:Liability of Lawyers for Instituting Unjustified Medical MalpracticeActions, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1083-84 (1977).
26 See, e.g., Belsky v. Lowenthal, 62 App. Div. 2d 319, 323, 405 N.Y.S.2d 62, 65 (1st
Dep't 1978), aff'd, 47 N.Y.2d 820, 392 N.E.2d 560, 418 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1979); Chappelle v.
Gross, 26 App. Div. 2d 340, 345, 274 N.Y.S.2d 555, 561 (1st Dep't 1966) (Stuwer, J.,
dissenting).
27 See Note, A Lawyer's Duty to Reject GroundlessLitigation, 26 WAYNE L. REv. 1561,
1570 (1980). See also S. TISHER, L. BERNA1EI & M. GREEN, BRINGING THE BAR TO JUSTcE: A
COMPATIVE STUDY OF Six BAR AssoCIATIONs 86 (1977); Steele & Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and ProfessionalRegulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUNDATION RE SEARCH J. 919, 934-35.
" See Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d 895, 899-903 (Ky. 1981). Although the rule of absolute privilege has fallen into disfavor, courts continually reject actions against attorneys for
negligence in the absence of privity. Hill v. Willmott, 561 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky. Ct. App.
1978); Spencer v. Burglass, 337 So. 2d 596, 601 (La. Ct. App. 1976); see Berlin, Countersuit,
in LEGAL MED. 117, 121-29 (A. James, Jr., ed. 1980). In recent years, however, courts have
allowed negligence suits by third parties in the absence of privity when the third party's
interest in the attorney's activity was not adverse. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223,
228-29, 449 P.2d 161, 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1969); Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583,
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Kentucky recently affirmed a jury verdict awarding compensatory
and punitive damages against an attorney who had filed a "shotgun" complaint against a radiologist and an orthopedic surgeon,
alleging that their "careless and negligent" treatment of a heart
attack victim had caused a fracture to the patient's shoulder.30 In
truth, the defendant-doctors had only treated the patient after the
injury was detected by an emergency room physician, a fact readily
ascertainable from medical records in counsel's possession prior to
the filing of the lawsuit.3 1 The court approved the introduction of
expert testimony that counsel's conduct did not comply with the
standard of care exercised by ordinary and prudent lawyers.3 2 The
court reasoned that counsel's failure to investigate the facts and
law prior to filing the malpractice actions was material to the question of whether counsel had probable cause to institute the litiga-

tion and that a lack of probable cause should subject the plaintiff's

attorney to countersuit liability.3 Moreover, the court ruled that a
physician may recover substantial general damages for injury to his

reputation attributable to unfounded litigation.3 " Such injury was
held to be sufficient "special injury" to justify recognizing a claim
588-89, 364 P.2d 685, 688-89, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821, 824-25 (1961). The rationale underlying
these decisions appears to be that a duty is owed to a person with a mutual interest. See
Note, supra note 27, at 1570-79. Hence, although an attorney owes no duty of care to an
adverse party, he may owe a duty to the party's beneficiary. Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d at
228-29, 449 P.2d at 165, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 229; Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d at 590, 364 P.2d at
688-89, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 824-25. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 1576-79.
29

621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981).

30 Id. at 898-900. In Raine, two doctors, the defendants in a medical malpractice suit,
brought an action for malicious prosecution and abuse of process against two attorneys. Id.
at 898. The attorney, Raine, had visited the hospital where the alleged malpractice occurred
and reviewed records which clearly showed that the injury, the subject matter of the malpractice action, had occurred prior to either doctor's involvement with the injured plaintiff.
Id. Nevertheless, Raine drafted a complaint against the two doctors. He did not, however,
sign the complaint, having instead an associate ascribe to it. Id. The associate neither read
the complaint nor investigated the underlying facts. Id.
In affirming the trial court's dismissal of the abuse of process action, the Raine court
distinguished that action from one for malicious prosecution, noting that in the former, injury to reputation is not sufficient, but rather there must be actual injury to person or property. Id. at 902.
31 Id. at 898.
32 Id.

at 900-01.
Id. The deposition of Professor David Leibson of the Ethics Committee of the Louisville Bar Association was admitted as relevant to the element of lack of probable cause, a
necessary ingredient of a malicious prosecution action. Id. The additional element of malicious prosecution is the institution or continuation of a judicial proceeding terminating in
favor of the defendant. Id. at 899; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 676 (1976).
621 S.W.2d at 900.
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for malicious prosecution of a civil action. 5 Although reaching an
arguably "just" result, the Kentucky court not only adopted new
rules for determining trial counsel's liability, but also ignored the
long-established rule that pleadings are privileged. 36 Moreover, the
Raine court failed to consider the potential chilling effect inherent
in awards of substantial general and punitive damages against
37
counsel.

The countersuit has been touted as a much needed mechanism
to provide compensation for the burden and expense of baseless
and unwarranted litigation. One drawback to its benefits, however,
is the threat it may pose to the attorney-client privilege.3 8 In con35 See id. With respect to the issue of damages, the court initially noted that the physicians proved no "special, or out-of-pocket" injury. Id. The defendant-attorneys argued that
under Harter v. Lewis Stores, Inc., 240 S.W.2d 86 (Ky. 1951), recovery without special injury is permitted only where the reputation of the plaintiff was "assailed." 621 S.W.2d at
900. The Hartercourt had stated that "where [a] claim is not only false but its prosecution
was prompted by malice and without probable cause, the defendant has the right of recovery for expenses incurred and damages substained." 240 S.W.2d at 88. Additionally, the
Hartercourt specified that "where one's reputation ha[d] not been assailed," or one's property had not been seized, or one had not been imprisoned, one's damages in the malicious
prosecution action are "confined to ... loss of time and the reasonable expenses incurred in
the defense of the action beyond the ordinary costs." Id. The Raine court rejected the defendant-attorney's interpretation of these statements, and construed Harter as indicating
"that a plaintiff in a malicious prosecution action may recover for humiliation, mortification
and loss of reputation." 621 S.W.2d at 900. Recovery of these elements of damage apparently is in lieu of the special damage requirement.
8 See, e.g., Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 649 (6th Cir. 1968) ("[i]t is beyond argument that statements made in pleadings filed in a judicial proceeding come within the rule
of absolute privilege"); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 387 F. Supp. 702, 720-21 (S.D.
Miss. 1974) (statements made in pleadings that are "in any way relevant to the subject
matter of the action" are absolutely privileged even if made maliciously and with knowledge
of falsehood), rev'd in part on other grounds, modified in part on other grounds sub nom.
Dunn v. Koehring Co., 546 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1977); Dixie Broadcasting Corp. v. Rivers,
209 Ga. 98, 70 S.E.2d 734, 741 (1952) (absolute privilege protects defendant from liability
based on statements in pleadings). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 587 (1976).
37 Advocates of the countersuit suggest that such actions have a significant deterrent
effect on the filing of medical malpractice actions, and cite impressive statistics to buttress
their claims. See, e.g., Berlin, supra note 28, at 121. Unfortunately, such statistics do not
evince the number of frivolous actions that are deterred. Moreover, other reliable statistics
support the view that the vast majority of malpractice claims are not groundless. U.S. DF'T
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 10 (1973).
See Berg, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Friend or Foe?, 6 LITIGATION 24, 24 (Fall
1979). See generally R. MALLEN & V. LEvrrr, LEGAL MALPRACTICE 21-23 (2d ed. 1981).
Counsel is allowed to disclose the confidences and secrets of his client in order to defend
himself against the claims of third persons. Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
497 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974). Hence, when an attorney
discloses confidences in malpractice and malicious prosecution litigation, the net effect is an
invasion of the "delicate" and "exacting" attorney-client relation. See Berg, supra, at 24.
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trast, an award of fees directly against errant counsel as part of

"costs," pursuant to an appropriate standard of culpability, would
serve as a sufficient deterrent to frivolous litigation, without the
negative effects of a countersuit3 9 The availability of meaningful
judicial sanctions at the close of "vexatious" proceedings would ensure that some minimum reparation, as well as vindication, would
be provided without further delay and with some degree of certainty.40 Unlike in countersuit litigation, the trial judge will have
heard the evidence relevant to the issue of attorney misconduct in
the course of the original litigation. The original presiding judge
will be in the position to assess the harm done as well as the degree
of counsel's culpability, and to fashion a remedy adequately reflecting the egregiousness of the conduct and the public interest in
assuring access to the courts. 4 1 Unfortunately, judges have been reluctant to impose such sanctions. The restraint has occurred not
because of a lack of faith in the sanctions, but because of a perceived absence of authority under the rules governing procedure
and attorney discipline, 2 and a natural reluctance to police their
39 Birnbaum, supra note 25, at 1083. Proponents of awarding attorney's fees against
errant counsel argue that such an approach would deter, if not eliminate, unjustified litigation. See, e.g., id. This approach has been criticized, however, as being detrimental to the
redress of legitimate grievances. Id. Thus, it has been argued that "impos[ing] a penalty
upon a lawyer every time he loses a malpractice action would have a chilling effect on the
attorney's obligation to pursue the interests of a client who has a meritorious claim containing complex and novel issues." Id.
4" See Renfrew, supra note 5, at 269-71. In emphasizing that courts should utilize local
rules to provide sanctions for errant litigants and lawyers, one commentator has noted that
the tort remedies of malicious prosecution and abuse of process cannot satisfactorily ameliorate litigation abuses. Id. at 270-71. The fact that a countersuit entails more litigation, considerable delay and ultimately may yield only an expensive defeat, apparently adds to its
ineffectiveness. Cf. Risinger, supra note 2, at 44-45 (subsequent action in deceit against
attorney).
41 See 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 16, Rule 7 advisory committee note, at 5. It is unlikely that many countersuit plaintiffs
will be able to prove actual damages attributable to the "wrongful" litigation. For example,
the countersuit plaintiffs in Raine v. Drasin,see notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra,
were unable to establish that the litigation caused them any out-of-pocket losses. 621
S.W.2d at 900. Their primary interest was vindication. The harm done by the "defamatory
complaint" was, in all probability, significantly less than the plaintiffs imagined, and a judicially imposed sanction following dismissal of the original action would have "work[ed]
whatever exculpation courts can give." Cf. C. MORRIS, TORTS 285, 307-09 (1953) (vindication
of person injured by libel or slander).
42 See, e.g., Bauguess v. Paine, 22 Cal. 3d 626, 639, 586 P.2d 942, 950, 150 Cal. Rptr.
461, 469 (1978). But see, e.g., Pfister v. Delta Air Lines, 496 F. Supp. 932, 937-39 (N.D. Ga.
1980) (bad faith conduct in litigation warranted imposition of adversary's reasonable attorney's fees); Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411, 415-16 (W.D. La. 1977) (there
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brother lawyers under standards requiring a finding of subjective
"bad faith."43
B. The Model Rules of Professional Conduct
Aside from the privileges afforded the trial attorney at common law, it has been suggested that the institution of groundless
litigation has been encouraged by the philosophy that an attorney
need not judge the merits of his client's case." The "prevailing
ethic" is said to require the lawyer "to assert any position on behalf of his client unless the lawyer is absolutely convinced that the
position is frivolous or fraudulent."45 Presumably derived from the
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility, this "ethic" prohibits the filing of a lawsuit only if counsel "knows" or if it is "obvious" to him that there is no basis for proceeding, and that to do
so would be for the sole purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring another.46 Under this standard, it may fairly be stated that
counsel is acting improperly only if he is in possession of facts that
divest him of any plausible argument that his client's claims might
have merit. In the absence of such, counsel may file the lawsuit
based upon the information provided by his client and any arguable inferences derived therefrom. 47 Moreover, although the code
does not endorse the filing of an action for the sole purpose of obcould be an equitable shifting of responsibility for unreasonable and vexatious costs from
party to counsel), vacated, 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd sub nom. Roadway Express
Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980).
"' See F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129
(1974); Abney v. Ward, 440 F. Supp. 1129, 1132 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rosenberg, supra note 17,
at 9. Since most judges maintain close personal ties with other members of the bar, they
understand that lawyers may engage in practices that are "less than exemplary" in their zeal
to represent their clients. Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 9.
" See Note, supra note 27, at 1584.
Renfrew, supra note 5, at 279.
46 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIOMNAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1981). The code
provides:
(A) In his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not: (1) File a suit, assert a
position, conduct a defense, delay a trial, or take other action on behalf of his
client when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve merely to
harass or maliciously injure another.
Id. (emphasis added).
'7 Cf. State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 16-17, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1970) (in prosecution of attorney for false pretenses, responsibilities of counsel did not
include ascertaining the veracity of his client's claim unless he had actual knowledge of its
falsity or should have surmised its fraudulent nature). But see Note, supra note 27, at 158385 (an attorney's acts must reflect his determination of the claim's merit based on a thorough investigation).
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taining publicity"8 or coercing an unmerited settlement,49 and
while a more objective standard for judging attorney misconduct
may be unnecessary to guard against these particular excesses, it
can be argued that the code's subjective standards are unenforceable.50 Apparently, as an outgrowth of the "countersuit phenomenon," these subjective standards traditionally applied by lawyers
to judge the conduct of other lawyers have been reevaluated. The
result of this reevaluation is a shift in focus toward a standard akin
to that of gross negligence or recklessness.
In Tool Research & EngineeringCorp. v. Henigson,51 the California Court of Appeals adopted such a standard to determine if
counsel was amenable to an action for malicious prosecution. Although the Tool Research court rejected the argument that counsel
should be liable to an opponent for negligently assessing whether a
48 See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 46, DR 7-102(A)(2).
DR 7-102 provides that a lawyer should not "[kinowingly advance a claim ... that is un-

warranted ...
." Id.
4' See AMERICAN

COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, CODE OF TRIAL CONDUCT 1 (1972). The
ACTL Code provides that "a lawyer ... should decline to prosecute a cause or assert a
defense obviously devoid of merit, or which is intended merely to inflict harassment or injury, or to procure an unmerited settlement." Id. (emphasis added). The model code will
not endorse the practice of naming defendants solely for the purposes of obtaining free discovery to determine if a valid claim exists against that defendant or others. Singer &
Giampietro, The Countersuit, 6 LrrIGATION 18, 20 (Fall 1979); see Raine v. Drasin, No. 79CA-18-MR (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981). In
Raine, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky concluded that counsel had acted with an improper or unlawful motive:
Among other things, there is evidence indicating that his motivation may have
been to obtain discovery for his case against the hospital by suing the appellees
rather than employing the proper means of discovery provided in the Civil Rules.
No. 79-CA-18-MR, slip op. at 9.
60 See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-57 (1975). In a critique of Rule IV of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Professor Risinger stated:
The problem with subjective standards is enforceability. The problems with objective standards is that they inevitably cover some people whose actions were only
[A gross negligence] standard would encompass acthe result of negligence ....
tions such as the filing of an unfounded suit which proper investigation would
have revealed was unfounded, or the assertion of denials or defenses in similar
[Slome courts have already imposed such a duty of
circumstances ....

investigation ....

Risinger, supra note 2, at 60 n.193.
51 46 Cal. App. 3d 675, 120 Cal. Rptr. 291 (Ct. App. 1975). Tool Research involved a
malicious prosecution action against a corporation, its directors and its counsel. Id. at 678,
120 Cal. Rptr. at 294. The respondent, plaintiff's attorney in the original action, acted in
good faith after investigating his client's claim, and accepted the representation in the initial action. Id. at 679-80, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 294-95. A jury verdict was rendered for the defendants, however, and the present action was instituted. Id. at 681, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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favorable judgment was probable,52 it did adopt a twofold test with
an objective element:
The attorney must entertain a subjective belief in that the claim
merits litigation and that belief must satisfy an objective
standard.
...So long as the attorney does not ... [prosecute] a
claim which a reasonable lawyer would not regard as tenable or
...

unreasonably [neglect] to investigate the facts and law in

making his determination to proceed, his client's adversary has no
right to assert malicious prosecution against the attorney if the
lawyer's efforts prove unsuccessful."
This standard, in turn, influenced the drafters of the proposed
model rules currently before the ABA. Model rule 3.1, Meritorious
Claims and Contentions, provides that "[a] lawyer shall not bring
or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein,
unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."" The comment and notes that accompany
this model rule illuminate the drafters' intent that the phrase "a
basis for doing so that is not frivolous" is to be read as an objective
55
inquiry.

Id. at 683, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297; see Wng v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d 1279, 1286 (Ind.,.
Ct. App. 1981). In Wong, a physician filed a malicious prosecution action against the plaintiffs for instituting a malpractice action against him. 422 N.E.2d at 1282. The Court of Appeals of Indiana, in holding that the physician failed to meet his burden of proving the
element of lack of probable cause, 422 N.E.2d at 1288-89; see note 33 supra, noted that
counsel cannot be liable for "[m]ere negligence in asserting a claim," 422 N.E.2d at 1286; see
R. MALLEN & V. LEviTT, supra note 38, at 123.
62 46 Cal. App. 3d at 683-84, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 297; see Wong v. Tabor, 422 N.E.2d
at
1288 (reasonableness of attorney's action is assessed by objective standard: whether a reasonable attorney, based on facts known to him, would "consider that the claim was worthy
of litigation").
" FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.1.
55Id. The notes following the model rule compare the new rule to DR 7-102(A)(1) of
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, see note 46 supra, noting three distinctions.
The model rule changes the test for improper conduct by requiring a "nonfrivolous" basis
for the claim compared with the disciplinary rule's requirement of action "merely to'harass
or maliciously injure another." FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.1 note
(Code Comparison). Furthermore, it proposes an objective test whereas the disciplinary rule
requires knowledge by the attorney "when it is obvious" that a claim is unwarranted before
it applies. Id. Finally, the model rule advocates an exception in a criminal action so that a
prosecutor must meet his burden of proof even if there is no "nonfrivolous" basis for the
client's defense. Id. The 1981 Draft of the model rules provided that "[a] lawyer shall not
62

bring or defend a proceeding . . . unless there is a reasonable basis for doing so .... .
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (Proposed Final Draft 1981) [hereinafter

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:625

Although the model rules have not yet been adopted by the
ABA, the standard set forth in the comment and notes accompanying rule 3.1 should not only lead more state courts to retreat from
a rule of attorney immunity, but more importantly, should encourage a more liberal interpretation of existing authority which
permits judicially imposed sanctions. If there is agreement that
more objective standards for controlling adversary ethics are
needed and that judicially imposed fee awards are the preferred
method of enforcing such standards, a critique of the efficacy of
current statutes and rules of practice, as well as an examination of
proposals for their modification, can be undertaken. 56
C. Federal Rule 11 Sanctions as an Alternative to the
Countersuit
The current text of federal rule 11 provides:
Every pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record ....

The signature of

an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and
false ....

For a wilful violation ...

an attorney may be sub-

57
jected to appropriate disciplinary action.

As presently written, rule 11 speaks in subjective terms." Specifically, counsel's certification is only an assertion made "to the
best of his knowledge, information, and belief," and the rule's enforcement provisions can only be invoked when an attorney signs a
pleading with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule or "willfully"
violates it. The only express remedy for a violation of the rule is
cited as 1981 DRAFT OF MODEL RULES].
56

Doubts that the model rules or the "Kutak" proposals would be adopted were ex-

pressed following the Annual Meeting of the ABA's House of Delegates in 1981. See Ethics

Code Keeps Inching Along; Will it Ever Get Approval?, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 24, 1981, at 8, col.
12; see Lumbard, Setting Standards:The Courts, the Bar, and the Lawyers' Code of Conduct, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 249, 254-64 (1981).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980).
" It has been asserted that under rule 11 an attorney has some affirmative duty to
investigate a client's claim. See Risinger, supra note 2, at 54. If there exists a "circumstantial nexus" between the facts known to the attorney and the pleading to be filed, he may
have an obligation to investigate depending on the type of case and the degree of difficulty.
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dismissal of all or part of a claim or defense, or referral to disciplinary authorities.6 0 Moreover, courts have tended to require a showing of subjective "bad faith" as a prerequisite to the imposition of
sanctions under rule 11." For example, judges have stated that
"[a] pleading should be stricken only when it appears beyond peradventure that it is sham and false and that its allegations are devoid of factual basis, ' 2 or that sanctions should be imposed only if
there is "clear evidence" that the pleading was filed without a colorable claim and for an improper purpose.6 3
Id. at 55. As a practical matter, however, this is the normal practice of a competent attorney
and thus no willful violation of rule 11 will occur where a "circumstantial nexus" exists. Id.
at 55-56.
60 FED. R. Cw. P. 11. Courts have held that rule 11 does not sanction an award of
attorney's fees even if there has been a willful violation of the rule. See, e.g., United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 603 F.2d 100, 103 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979); Orenstein v. Compusamp, Inc., 19
Fed. R. Serv. 2d 466, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). This, however, may be subject to the narrow
exception which allows the assessment of attorney's fees against an unsuccessful litigant
who has acted in "bad faith." See Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973).
" See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350 (2d Cir. 1980); notes 87-95 and accompanying text infra. See also FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.3. The comment accompanying the rule asserts that an attorney's personal knowledge of matters contained in pleadings or other litigation documents is not required. FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL
RULES, supra note 13 comment (Representations by a Lawyer). "However, an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge... may properly be made only when the
lawyer knows ... [it] is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent
inquiry." Id.
62 Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see Brown v. Cameron-Brown
Co., 30 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1181, 1189 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 31 Fed. R. Serv.
2d 1362 (4th Cir. 1981). This strict standard was set forth by the court in Murchison so as
not to "deprive a party of his right to a trial of the issues posed by his complaint" which
could result in a "trial by affidavits." 27 F.R.D. at 19; see Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593,
600 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Cornaglia v. Ricciardi, 63 F.R.D. 416, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
13 Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348 (2d Cir. 1980); see notes 86-94 and accompanying text infra. Such strict standards do not encourage resort to rule 11 as a source of
judicial control over adversary ethics, and are anomalous in a system that does not favor, or
generally permit, inquiry into the merits of claims and defenses prior to trial. See Risinger,
supra note 2, at 613. The reluctance of trial judges to grant such relief in the form of pleastriking is evident. E.g., Murchison v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 14, 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (in response
to allegations that counsel had encouraged false verification of a shareholder derivative action, the court eschewed "trial by affidavit"); see Papilsky v. Berndt, 17 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
214, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (defendants may not create a trial on paper by their characterization of the pleadings). But see Rhinehart v. Stauffer, 638 F.2d 1169, 1170 (9th Cir. 1979)
(complaint dismissed where plaintiff's counsel had not conferred with his client and was
unable to conduct any meaningful discussion of the case with opposing counsel); Folding
Cartons, Inc. v. American Can Co., 28 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 235, 242 & n.20 (N.D. I1. 1979)
(timing and circumstances surrounding the filing of an amended complaint, together with
failure of plaintiff's counsel to offer any rational explanation for adding new defendants,
evidenced fact that the amendment was made only to salvage plaintiff's "class action allegations"); Freeman v. Kirby, 27 F.R.D. 395, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (attorney must do more than
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Notwithstanding its apparent shortcomings, several courts
have relied upon rule 11 as a source of authority for the imposition
of fee awards against trial counsel. For example, in Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Federal Savings & Loan Association," plaintiff's
counsel filed a "shotgun" complaint naming as defendants 177
mortgage and thrift institutions in a class action, alleging that
their use of the "escrow" method of collecting tax prepayments violated the federal antitrust laws. 5 At the time the complaint was
filed, counsel did not know which institutions followed this particular practice, and chose to sue every individual or lending institution listed as a mortgage broker in the Philadelphia phone book.
Later, forty-six defendants were voluntarily dismissed. 6 The remaining defendants moved to dismiss, alleging that counsel had violated rule 11. Although the court refused to strike the pleadings
on behalf of these remaining defendants, 7 it did require plaintiff's
counsel personally to reimburse the dismissed defendants for the
costs and expenses incurred in appearing and defending. Although
observing that there may be instances in which a potential defendant's refusal to cooperate with a pre-suit investigation might justify joinder, the court concluded that it is an "abuse of process" to
use a complaint to discover which of a number of parties is a
proper defendant.6 8
Similarly, in Textor v. Board of Regents of Northern Illinois
University,6 9 the women's athletic director of Northern Illinois
University (NIU) brought an action against all the members of the
Mid-America Conference,70 when it should have been apparent
just lend his name to pleading).
365 F. Supp. 975 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
" Id. at 977.
Id. at 977 n.1.
" Id. at 983. The court noted that the remaining defendants were not prejudiced by
any improper actions of the plaintiff's attorney because an investigation would have revealed them as proper parties to the action. Id. Therefore, the court stated that these remaining defendants had suffered no injury and, accordingly, if the case were dismissed as to
them, it simply would just be refiled, rendering the court's action futile. Id.

" Id. The court vigorously denounced the plaintiff's counsel for sending out a "dragnet" and inconveniencing the parties that were voluntarily dismissed. Id. at 982; cf. Miller v.
Schweickart, 413 F. Supp. 1059, 1061-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (where attorney violated rule 11 by
basing the complaint on unverified rumor and hearsay, the court exercised its discretion
under section 11(e) of the Securities Act of 1933, awarding costs to the dismissed

defendants).
69 87 F.R.D. 751 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
70 Id. at 753. The Mid-America Conference is comprised of the following schools: Ball
State University, Bowling Green State University, Kent State University, Miami University,
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that in personam jurisdiction could not be obtained over any defendant other than NIU. 1 Plaintiff's counsel made no effort to correct the situation when it was brought to his attention, and did not
respond to defendants' motion to dismiss. 72 The district court, after dismissing the moving defendants, thereby terminating the case
as to all but NIU, imposed a fee award directly against plaintiff's
counsel. 3
Kinee and Textor suggest that rule 11 may provide an alternative to the countersuit, at least in the most egregious cases. In
74
Raine v. Drasin,
the court could have required plaintiff's counsel
to reimburse defendants for their attorneys' fees and expenses following the termination of the original malpractice action. 75 A fee

award would have compensated the victims of the unwarranted litigation for their out-of-pocket losses, and provided them with some
measure of vindication, without the delay and expense of a second
action. Similarly, the institutional defendant in Beacon Journal
Publishing Co. v. Zonack, Poulos & Cain,6 which had been sued in
an improper forum for an improper purpose, might have obtained
expenses and attorney's fees upon motion following dismissal from
the lawsuit. Each case presented clear and easily identifiable litigation abuse. By virtue of a rule 11 award, no windfall would have
accrued to the former defendants, and any financial hardship, appropriately, would have fallen upon the best "risk-avoider," plaintiff's counsel. 7 The desired deterrence would have been achieved
Central, Eastern, and Western Michigan Universities, Ohio University, and the University

of Toledo. Id. at 753 n.1. All were named as defendants. Id.
71 Id. at 753. None of the defendant universities, except NIU, had "any but the most
tangential contacts" with the forum state. Id.
72 Id. at 754.
71 Id. at 754-55. The court concluded that the plaintiff might have a legitimate claim
against NIU and, therefore, was "reluctant to penalize" her by striking the complaint. Id. at
754. Thus, the court imposed fees against her attorney because of his willful violation of rule
11. Id. at 754-55. The court also assessed those fees against the plaintiff's counsel because of
his failure to state the correct venue. Id.; cf. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL
OPINIONS,

No. 1011 (1967) (it is unethical to intentionally file suit in the wrong venue in

hope of securing a default judgment).
71 621 S.W.2d 895 (Ky. 1981); see notes 29-35 and accompanying text supra.
7' See 9 Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. CR-11 (Baldwin 1978). The Kentucky rule 11 is identical

to the federal rule 11. Id.; see note 57 and accompanying text supra.
7' No. 79 Ap. 123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979); see note 24 supra.
7" See Board of Educ. v. Marting, 185 N.E.2d 597, 600 (Ohio C.P. 1962). In Marting,a

malicious prosecution action was allowed to proceed against counsel. Id. The court stated
that "an attorney, due to his background and education, is in much better position to minimize error." Id.
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without the "chilling effect" of an award of general and punitive
71
damages.
To encourage the use of rule 11 as a sanctioning mechanism
for deterring groundless litigation, the Judicial Conference of the
United States has released a proposed amendment which modifies
the present culpability threshold of absence of subjective "good
faith," and expressly authorizes the imposition of fee awards
against errant counsel. With respect to a culpability threshold for
the imposition of sanctions, the proposed rule provides:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to
the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause
unnecessary
79
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
This proposed amendment would "codify" an attorney's duty
to conduct at least a minimal investigation prior to filing a complaint or interposing a counterclaim. The Advisory Committee's
comments to the 1981 draft of the proposed rules asserted that the
"reasonableness" of the investigation must be judged in light of all
the circumstances presented by the particular case at the time the
pleading was filed.80 Some latitude is to be accorded the attorney
in the event that there is insufficient time for an investigation,"1 or
78 Presumably, rule 11 fee awards should also be imposed for frivolous denials and
counterclaims. See In re Nat'l Student Mktg. Litig., 78 F.R.D. 726, 728 (D.D.C. 1978); cf.
Arena v. Luckenbach Steamship Co., 279 F.2d 186, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1960) (counsel may not
file answer creating issues); text accompanying note 92 infra. Of course, federal rules 36(a)
(Request for Admission) and 37(c) (Expenses on Refusal to Admit) already provide a mechanism for shifting the costs of proof to a party who interposes groundless denials. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 36, 37(c). For an excellent introduction to the use of rule 36, see Epstein, Rule 36:
In Praise of Requests to Admit, 7 LITIGATION 30 (Spring 1981).
79

FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

supra

note 16, Rule 11.

80 1981

DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra

note 16, Rule 11 advisory committee note, at 8. The note suggests that the proposal creates
a more rigid standard than the "good faith" qualification of rule 11 and thus will be available under more varied circumstances. Id. (citing Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 349 (2d
Cir. 1980)).
81 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 16, Rule 11 advisory committee note, at 8. One situation in which a failure to investigate may be warranted is where the statute of limitations prompts a filing with little investigation. For such a scenario, see Kirsch v. Duryea, 21 Cal. 3d 303, 311, 578 P.2d 935, 940, 146
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if an informal investigation would prove futile or unduly expensive. 2 The notes accompanying the proposed amendment, however, clearly express the intent of its authors that the new culpability threshold should be interpreted as more stringent than the
present "good faith" standard, and should be utilized in a greater
number of situations. 3
A plausible interpretation of the proposed rule is that it establishes gross negligence or recklessness as the culpability threshold
for the imposition of fee awards." ' Like the proposed model rules,
the amendment injects an objective element into an otherwise subjective standard for attorney conduct.8 ' The question in any case
becomes not simply whether counsel believed he was acting properly, but also whether, prior to filing, counsel made a reasonable
inquiry and factual assessment upon which to predicate his subsequent activity.8 6
In Nemeroff v. Abelson, 7 the plaintiff sued certain "publishing defendants" alleging that they deliberately had leaked material, nonpublic information about forthcoming financial columns to
Cal. Rptr. 218, 223 (1978) (en banc).
82 Risinger, supra note 2, at 55. The notes accompanying the 1981 draft of the proposed

amendments to the federal rules suggest that counsel will be accorded some degree of latitude where he reasonably relies on the investigation of forwarding counsel or another member of the bar. See 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 16, Rule 11 advisory committee note, at 8; cf. Raine v. Drasin, 621 S.W.2d
895, 902-03 (Ky. 1981) (attorney who signed complaint at request of trial attorney, but who
otherwise did not participate in litigation, should not be held liable for malicious
prosecution).
82 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 16, Rule 11 advisory committee note, at 8; see Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 350
(2d Cir. 1980).
84 See Kinee v. Abraham Lincoln Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 365 F. Supp. 975, 982-83
(E.D. Pa. 1973).
85 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
88 See Nemeroff v. Abelson, 620 F.2d 339, 348-50 (2d Cir. 1980). According to the "bad
faith" exception to the American rule, a federal court may award counsel fees to a victorious
party when opposing counsel or the opposing party acted vexatiously or for oppressive reasons. 6 J. MOORE, supra note 2, 54.77[2], at 1709. The power to impose such an award is
said to be based upon "the original authority of the chancellor to do equity in a particular
situation." Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (quoting Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307
U.S. 161, 166 (1939)). It accords an equity court "the unquestioned power to award attorney's fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by
hampering enforcement of a court order." Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 689 n.14 (1978).
See generally Note, Attorney's Fees and the Federal Bad Faith Exception, 29 HASTINGS
L.J. 319, 323-30 (1977).
S7 620 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1980).
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certain investors, enabling the latter to trade at a profit.8 After
discovery, the plaintiff conceded his inability to substantiate his
theory of the case, and agreed to a stipulation of voluntary
dismissal with prejudice.89 The publishing defendants then moved
for an award of costs, disbursements, and attorney's fees contending that the action had been initiated in violation of rule 11 and in
"bad faith." 90 The district court awarded $50,000 in fees, to be
paid by plaintiff and plaintiff's counsel.91 On appeal, the Second
Circuit appeared to have some reservations about the authority of
a trial court to award fees under rule 11,92 but avoided the issue by
equating the culpability threshold of rule 11 with that required for
an award of fees under the "bad faith" exception to the "American" rule. After reciting the traditional requirement that there "be
'clear evidence' that the claims are 'entirely without color and
made for reasons of harassment or delay or for other improper purposes,' , and after reviewing the record for evidence of bad faith,
88 Id. at 341. Nemeroff was a shareholder of Technicare Corp. and argued that the negative comments made about the corporation would cause its stock to drop, thus allowing the
defendants to trade at a profit by "selling Technicare short prior to publication and making
covering purchases at a depressed price after publication." Id.
89 Id. at 342.
00 Id.
Id.

92 Id. at 350. The court expressed no opinion on the validity of an attorney's fees award

under rule 11 but merely assumed "arguendo" that such an award was sanctioned by the
rule. Id. Rule 11, if amended, would provide in part:
If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court,
upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed
it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses
incurred because of the filing of the pleading, including a reasonable attorney's
fee.
FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 16,

Rule 11.
It once was thought that fee awards under rule 11 might be improper on the theory that
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) provided the exclusive source of authority for
imposing money payments on an attorney. Risinger, supra note 2, at 47-51. In Roadway
Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980), the Court ruled that attorney's fees could not be
imposed upon counsel as "costs" under the original section 1927, Act of June 25, 1948, ch.
646, 62 Stat. 957. 447 U.S. at 758. On the other hand, the Court approved a fee award
pursuant to rule 37. Id. at 764. Congress then amended section 1927 to authorize fee awards
against attorneys. See Act of Sept. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1156. One
commentator attributes Congress' reversal of the Court's restrictive reading of section 1927
to the new standards for attorney conduct contained in the proposed model rules. See Ryan,
Hazards of Vexatious Conduct in Litigation, 30 DEF. L.J. 123, 137 (1981).
93 620 F.2d at 348 (quoting Browning Debenture Holders' Comm. v. DASA Corp., 560
F.2d 1078, 1088 (2d Cir. 1977)) (emphasis supplied by court).
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the court cited the 1981 draft of the ABA model rules 94 and held:
A claim is colorable, [and therefore not commenced in bad faith]
for the purpose of the bad faith exception, when it has some legal
and factual support, considered in light of the reasonable beliefs
of the individual making the claim. The question is whether a
reasonable attorney could have concluded that facts supporting
the claim might be established,
not whether such facts actually
95
had been established.

Adoption of the proposed amendments to rule 11 would codify
the Nemeroff definition of "bad faith," and serve notice on attorneys practicing in federal court of their duty to refrain from instituting frivolous litigation. In addition, the amended rule might encourage similar developments by the states. Although substantial
historical support exists for the proposition that any court of general jurisdiction may assess fees against counsel in summary proceedings,98 few state courts have recognized a "bad-faith" exception. 7 Many states, however, have adopted federal rule 11 in its
present form. Wider circulation of the Proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and adoption of the proposed amendments
9, See 620 F.2d at 348 n.16; 1981 DRAFr OF MODEL RULES, supra note 55, Rule 3.1; note
61 supra.
,5 620 F.2d at 348 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The court noted that the
plaintiff's attorney reasonably could have concluded that there were indications of several
relationships and activities from which improprieties in the trading of Technicare stock
could be inferred. Id. at 349. Furthermore, the court observed that "[e]ven if some or all of
these facts were not in fact true," the beliefs of plaintiff's counsel were reasonable and sufficient to warrant his claim. Id. Although the court found that the action had been commenced in good faith, it remanded to the district court the issues of whether the conduct of
the litigation was "intentionally dilatory," and whether at some point in the litigation prior
to dismissal,-the plaintiff became apprised of facts sufficient to require withdrawal of the
action rather than continued prosecution. Id. at 350-51.
11 See Risinger, supra note 2, at 46-47. It has been observed that the summary proceeding was an effective alternative to a suit against an attorney for fees, since it was not controlled by the strict criminal proceedings involved in a contempt action, but was an exercise
of the court's "inherent supervisory powers." Id. at 45.
97 Note, supra note 86, at 332. On rare occasions the "bad faith" exception has been
adopted by a state or noted in dicta. See, e.g., Theordore D. Bross Line Constr. Corp. v.
Ryan Crane Serv. Corp., 32 Conn. Supp. 181, 182, 345 A.2d 594, 595 (Super. Ct. 1975) (dictum that exception exists where suit is "wholly vexatious and without any basis"); St. Joseph's College v. Morrison, Inc., 158 Ind. App. 272, 280, 302 N.E.2d 865, 871 (Ct. App. 1973)
(court can impose attorney's fees if party's conduct is "vexatious and oppressive in the extreme"); Feist v. Luzerne County Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 22 Pa. Commw. 181, 347 A.2d
772, 781 (Commw. Ct. 1975) (plaintiff attempting to wear down opposing party through
litigation may be assessed fees based upon bad faith). Only three states statutorily have
adopted the "bad faith" exception. See GA. CODE ANN. § 20-1404 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
110, § 41 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-26-31 (1974).
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to rule 11 could encourage parallel state rules or legislation, and
wider recognition by state trial judges of their "inherent power" to
sanction attorneys for abusing the judicial process.
III.

DELAY

The Trial Attorney as an Officer of the Court

A.

Perhaps the most pervasive hindrance to the administration of
justice is delay in the disposition of actions commenced in "good
faith." All experienced trial counsel are familiar with the tactics
and techniques of delay: the spurious counterclaim, the
hypertechnical or noncolorable motion, the duplicative discovery
request, or the dilatory and obstructive response interposed to
frustrate a legitimate discovery request.9 8 Although several of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as their state counterparts
specifically are intended to regulate dilatory litigation tactics and
curb discovery abuse, 99 generally it is conceded that the problem of
delay demands modification, if not sweeping reform, of existing
standards. 100
As in the case of groundless litigation, the current version of
the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility exhorts counsel to "seek the lawful objectives of his client through [all] reasona98

See, e.g., Gold v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1981, at 7, col. 3 (Sup. Ct.

N.Y. County Oct. 13, 1981); Ciccone v. Cabrini Health Care Center, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14, 1981,
at 10, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County Oct. 13, 1981). See generally W. GLASER, PRETRIAL DisCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 182-88 (1968); 4 J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 26.02[3];
Gruenberger, Discovery from Class Members: A Fertile Field for Abuse, 4 LITIGATION 35,
35-36 (Fall 1977); 2 Firms Fined for DelayingMedical MalpracticeCases, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 14,
1981, at 1, col. 2.
'" See FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 37, 41(b). Rule 11 requires all pleadings to be signed by the
attorney of record. Under this rule, the signature "constitutes a certificate ... that...
there is good ground to support [the pleading]; and that it is not interposed for delay." FED.
R. Civ. P. 11. Violation of the rule may result in the striking of the pleading from the
proceedings and disciplinary action against the attorney. Id. Rule 37 imposes costs and attorney's fees upon a party who wrongfully refuses to answer questions during discovery proceedings, and upon a party who, without substantial justification, accuses another of refusing to answer. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a). Rule 41 provides for involuntary dismissal of an action
for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIv. P. 41(b).
100 See generally 4 J. MOORE, supra note 2, 1 26.02[3]; Kennelly, Pretrial Discovery-the Courts and Trial Lawyers are Finally Discovering That Too Much of It Can Be
Counterproductive,21 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 458, 468-74 (1978); Liman, The Quantum of Discovery vs. The Quality of Justice: More Is Less, 4 LITIGATION 8, 8 (Fall 1977); Bonauie,
ProfessionalResponsibility, Practiceand Procedure:A Disciplinary Void (pt. 2), N.Y.L.J.,
June 26, 1981, at 1, col. 1.
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bly available means,"'' 1 while refraining from "assert[ing] a position, conduct[ing] a defense, delay[ing] a trial, or tak[ing] other
action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious
that such action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure
another. ' 10 2 On its face, the rule disapproves of only those tactics
which are intentionally dilatory. Thus, the rule may fairly be criticized for not advancing a stronger position. Indeed, under the rule,
delay is permissible if the tactic arguably serves some other legitimate purpose. °3 Nevertheless, abuses not corrected by the rule
may be rectified by the court even in the absence of express statutory authority. In ControlData Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan
04
for example, trial counsel exhausted the
Area Transit Authority,1
patience of the court with a series of motions which had "the effect, if not the purpose, of prolonging litigation that [had] already
been overlawyered and protracted beyond reason."' 0 5 After issuing
an order denying a motion as "frivolous," the court was served
with a fourteen-page "Memorandum of Points and Authorities"
seeking reconsideration of the prior order and a retraction of certain comments by the trial judge that appeared to reflect adversely
upon counsel's good faith in presenting the motion. In a diplomatic
response, the trial judge observed:
The increase in relatively complex civil litigation . . . has been
accompanied by increased opportunities for delay, obfuscation
and expense. A simple corollary to this change in circumstances is
a heightened need for counsel to bear in mind ... their duty, as
officers of the Court, to cooperate in securing the "just, speedy,
and inexpensive determination of every action."
The Court will hold the parties and counsel responsible by
sanctions and by disciplinary reference for any further failures by
counsel to conduct reasonable, forthcoming discovery, sensible
framing of the narrow issues to be tried, and efficient preparation
and trial of them pursuant to the letter and spirit of [the Federal
DR 7-101(A)(1) (1981).
Id.
10" See, e.g., Edelstein, The Ethics of Dilatory Motion Practice: Time for Change, 44
FORDHAM L. REv. 1069, 1073 (1976). The few ethical opinions addressing delay focus on
'o' MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
102

attorney conduct as deceit, without affirmatively rejecting delay as a legitimate litigation
objective. See, e.g., ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 557

(1963) (filing of a motion for changes of venue containing false statements).
104 87 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1980).
10 Id. at 378.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:625

Rules of Civil Procedure].'0 "
Control Data is one of several cases in which trial judges, notwithstanding the absence of any violation of the disciplinary rules,
have exercised the court's inherent disciplinary power to prevent
or correct abuse of the rules of procedure. 10 7 Aside from the court's
inherent power, several modifications of DR 7-102(a)(1) have been
advanced that attempt to minimize attorney abuse of the rules of
ethics and procedure. For example, in a recent article on dilatory
motion practice, Judge David Edelstein observed that situations
frequently arise in which the unintentional delay attendant to a
motion so outweighs the nondelay gain to counsel's client that the
submission of the motion ought to be deterred.1 0 8 Accordingly, he
suggested that DR 7-102 be amended to provide that in the representation of a client, a lawyer "shall not. . . submit a motion intended primarily for delay or where the lawyer knows or should
know that substantial delay will result and that if granted the motion will secure very insubstantial relief."1 ° A similar proposal is
advanced in model rule 3.2, which states, "[a] lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."11 0 The comment for the rule sets forth the appropriate standard: "The question is whether a competent lawyer
acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having
some substantial purpose other than delay. Realizing financial or
other benefit from otherwise improper delay in litigation is not a
legitimate interest of the client." ' 1
Both of these proposals affirmatively reject delay as a legitimate litigation objective. Under either proposed standard, it is not
enough that some minimal nondelay benefit might accrue to the
client. Indeed, if counsel had actual or constructive 1 2 knowledge
10' Id. at 379, 381 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1).
107 Id.; see In re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1035-36 (2d Cir. 1976); Associated Radio Serv.

Co. v. Page Airways, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 633, 636-37 (D. Tex. 1977); SCM Societa Commerciale
S.P.A. v. Industrial & Com. Research Corp., 72 F.R.D. 110, 112 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
"08 See Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1075-80. See also FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES,
supra note 13, Rule 3.2.
109 Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1079.
110 FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.2.
'
12

Id. comment.
See Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1077. In order to demonstrate the need for a more

objective standard, Judge Edelstein offers the following hypothetical:
[A] discovery motion [is filed] whose disposition would require extensive responsive argumentation by the respondent, consideration by the court of large numbers of legal arguments and great amounts of documentation, and perhaps an evi-
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that only insubstantial relief would be obtained, then the interposition of a dilatory motion, request, or objection, would expose the
attorney to court-imposed sanctions or referral to disciplinary authorities.113 Hence, it is clear that both contemporary judicial opinion and the proposed modifications of the federal rules echo the
model rules' emphasis upon a more objective culpability threshold
as a prerequisite for disciplinary action, and, in addition, call for a
balance between legitimate ends and foreseeable delay of the litigation process.
B.

The Insubstantial Counterclaim

Previously, reference was made to the assertion of frivolous
denials and counterclaims as a method of securing delay. The trial
114
court opinion in In re National Student Marketing Litigation
presents a classic example of the insubstantial counterclaim. In
that multidistrict securities fraud litigation, one group of
defendants filed a counterclaim against the class plaintiffs and
their counsel alleging fraud and professional misconduct in connection with a prior settlement. These charges were accompanied by
defense counsel's request to the Securities and Exchange Commission to initiate disciplinary proceedings against plaintiffs' counsel.1 1 5 After granting summary judgment in favor of the class plain-

tiffs, the trial judge awarded them attorney's fees under the federal
"bad faith" exception. The defendants based their opposition to an
award of fees upon the "nonfrivolous" nature of their claim. The
dentiary hearing. Further, the movant in this hypothetical situation might know
or reasonably expect that the information to be obtained if the motion is granted
will be of almost no use to his client's case. Finally, the movant might know or
reasonably expect that the submission of the motion will result in substantial delay to the litigation.
Id.; cf. Bankers Trust Co. v. Publicker Indus., Inc., No. 80-7895 (2d Cir. 1981) (appellant
ordered to pay double the costs of appeal and its opponents' other expenses up to $10,000
for pursuing an appeal "without the slightest chance of success" and for purposes of delaying payment). See also Custom Craft Carpets, Inc. v. Miller, No. 2-60699 (Cal. Ct. App.
1982).
M15
See Umin, Discovery Reform: A New Era or Business as Usual?, 65 A.B.A. J. 1050,
1051-52 (1979); Underwood, Discovery According to FederalRule 34, 26 PRAC. LAw. 55, 6566 (March 1980). See generally Perlman, The Federal Discovery Rules: A Look at New
Proposals,15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 57, 57-100 (1979). As to recent amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure based on American Bar Association proposals, see Underwood, The
New Amendments to the Federal Discovery Rules, 26 PRAc. LAW. 23, 23-35 (June 1980).
...445 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1978).
135 Id. at 159. The complaint with the SEC was not supported by probative evidence of
any wrongdoing, and violated the spirit, if not the letter, of DR 7-105(A).
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court rejected their arguments, noting that the timing of the counterclaim and other dilatory conduct by the defendants demonstrated that the counterclaim was substantially motivated by either vindictiveness or a desire to delay the progress of the
litigation. The court opined:
[T]he ["bad faith"] standard does not require that the legal and
factual bases for the action prove totally frivolous; where a litigant is substantially motivated by vindictiveness, obduracy or
mala tides, the assertion of a colorable claim will not bar the assessment of attorneys' fees against him."'
A similar willingness to impose fee awards to discourage delay
was exhibited by the Sixth Circuit in Grinnell Brothers, Inc. v.
Touche Ross & Co.,'" in which the defensive maneuver was a removal from state to federal court. After securing a remand, plaintiffs moved for costs, including attorney's fees, alleging that the
attempted removal was "obviously improper" and vexatious." 8
The Sixth Circuit, without considering whether the removal was
sought in "bad faith," affirmed the trial court's assessment of fees
and costs "in the interests of justice." '
In both National Student Marketing and Grinnell Brothers,
the respective courts appeared to focus more on the effect of the
pleading or petition and less on the intent of the litigant or his
counsel. In Grinnell, and, perhaps, even in National Student Marketing, counsel might have made a colorable argument that their
conduct complied with DR 7-102(A), insofar as neither had intentionally sought to harass their adversary nor acted solely to secure
delay. The approach in both cases, however, was consistent with
the standard set forth in proposed model rule 3.2 as well as proposed amended rule 11. Both would regulate the filing of a counterclaim or removal petition, and both would encourage the trial
judge to examine motions with multiple purposes to determine
whether the nondelay interest of counsel's client substantially out116Id.

655 F.2d 725 (6th Cir. 1981).
"I Id. at 725. In a civil action brought in state court, the defendant may file to have the
action removed to a federal district court which otherwise would have original jurisdiction.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446 (1976 & Supp. I 1977). Removal divests the state court of
jurisdiction, and may shift the locus of trial to a point more inconvenient for the state court
plaintiff. See 14 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
3737 (1976).
"0 655 F.2d at 727. Contra, Cornwall v. Robinson, 654 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1981) (reversing an award of fees in the absence of findings of subjective "bad faith").
1,7
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weighs the delay impact on the litigation as a whole.12 0
C.

The Dilatory Motion

Although federal rule 7(b)(2) provides that "[t]he rules applicable to captions, signing, and other matters of forms of pleadings
apply to all motions and other papers provided for by the rules,"
thereby incorporating by reference the certification requirements
of rule 11, there is a dearth of judicial authority considering rules
7(b)(2) and 11 in relation to litigation delay.1 21 Instead, the federal
bench predominantly has relied upon section 1927 of title 28,
which currently provides that "[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the United States. . .who
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorney's fees reasonably incurred be'1 22
cause of such conduct.'
This statute, however, patently requires more than the mere
multiplication of proceedings by an attorney. Indeed, the attorney's conduct must be "unreasonable and vexatious" before the resulting costs, expenses, and attorney's fees may be imposed. A majority of courts conclude, therefore, that the words "unreasonable
and vexatious" require a finding of "purposeful or malicious" behavior 2 3 or "serious and studied disregard for the orderly
processes of justice,' 24 and in so doing, severely undermine the
provision's effectiveness. 2 5 The fine lines that must be drawn in
120

Old rule 11 speaks to pleadings "interposed for delay." Proposed amended rule 11

requires counsel to certify that the pleading is "not interposed . . . to cause unnecessary
delay, or needless increase in the cost of litigation." FINAL DRAFr OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 16, Rule 11.
:21 Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1074.
22 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Prior to the 1980 amendment, the statute
did not expressly provide for an award of expenses and attorney's fees. See note 92 supra.
12 Cf. United States v. Ross, 535 F.2d 346, 350-51 (6th Cir. 1976) (where attorney's
failure to appear is negligent or inadvertent, statute not applicable).
124 Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968). But see In
re Sutter, 543 F.2d 1030, 1035 (2d Cir. 1976).
125 Comment, Sanctions Imposed by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the Judicial
Process,44 U. Cm. L. REV. 619, 625-28 (1977); see Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1071. Judge
Edelstein proposed that the culpability threshold of the statute be amended to provide:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court... may be
required by the court to satisfy personally such excess costs. Costs resultingfrom
the submission of a motion (1) intended primarily for delay, or (2) where the
attorney knew or should have known that substantial delay would result and
that if granted the motion would secure very insubstantialrelief are such costs.
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applying section 1927 can be illustrated by two recent cases involv126
ing attorney disqualification motions.
In North American Foreign Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp.,127 an
action for breach of contract, the defendant filed a motion to disqualify plaintiff's counsel on the ground that the latter's associate
previously had represented the defendant in a related matter. 2 In
fact, the defendant and defendant's counsel knew or should have
known that the prior representation was on a matter wholly unrelated to any of the issues on the contract action. Moreover, the
defendant's officers had made no objection to the alleged conflict
when it was initially brought to their attention. Under the circumstances, the trial judge found that the motion was "patently frivolous" and "made and pursued solely for purposes of harassment
and delay."' 29 The court observed that
[n]o purpose has been served by the instant motion other than to
harass plaintiff and his counsel and to delay these proceedings
further. The time has come to call a halt, or at least to have the
burden of these puerile litigation tactics fall on counsel, where it
belongs, rather than on the client or the court. This motion was
instituted in bad faith.... The motion was a ploy and it was
designed as a vexatious and oppressive tactic against plaintiff and
its counsel."30
In contrast, a fee award was denied on substantially similar
facts in R-T Leasing Corp. v. Ethyl Corp.,131 an unpublished opinion from the same district. In this action for breach of contract, the
plaintiff, R-T Leasing, moved to disqualify defendant's counsel
shortly after the defendant had moved for summary judgment, a
circumstance strongly suggesting that the motion had been made
Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1078 (emphasis in original).
M1Disqualification motions are often little more than "'tools of the litigation process,
being used. . . for purely strategic purposes.'" Allegaert v. Perot, 565 F.2d 246, 251 (2d Cir.
1977) (quoting Van Graafeiland, Lawyer's Conflict of Interest-A Judge's View (pt. 2),
N.Y.L.J., July 20, 1977, at 1, col. 2). The value of the disqualification motion as a delaying
tactic specifically was noted in Armstrong v. McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 437-38 (2d Cir. 1980)
(en banc), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 449 U.S. 1106 (1981). Recently, the
Supreme Court responded to this problem by ruling that orders denying motions to disqualify are not immediately appealable. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S.

368, 379 (1981).
83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
228Id. at 294.
:29Id. at 296.
130

Id. at 296-97.

1'1

No. 79-1720 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 1979).
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to delay the hearing on Ethyl Corporation's motion. Although
plaintiff's counsel had been presented with evidence strongly indicating that no material relationship existed between defendant's
trial counsel and R-T Leasing sufficient to justify disqualification,
the court was unwilling to conclude that no fact existed that could
form a reasonable basis for such a motion.
In order to provide a uniform test governing dilatory motion
practice, the advisory committee proposed that rule 7 be substantially rewritten to provide a self-contained rule dealing with delay.
The proposed revision tracked the language of proposed amended
rule 11:
Every motion and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is
not represented by an attorney shall sign the motion or other paper and state his address. The signature of an attorney or party
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the motion or
other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and
belief formed after reasonable inquiry there is good ground to
support it; and that it is not interposed primarily for any improper purpose, such as to harass, to cause delay, or to increase
the cost of litigation. If a motion or other paper is not signed, it
shall not be accepted for filing. If a motion or other paper is
signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of
the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the mo132
tion or other paper, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The thrust of this proposed rule was identical to that of proposed amended rule 11. A violation of the rule is occasioned when
counsel's primary motivation is delay. More significantly, the existence of some other legitimate objective will not suffice to prevent

discipline if that objective is not substantial.133 Additionally, an
132

1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULEs OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra

note 16, Rule 7.

'1 Judge Edelstein's proffer for a new rule 7 provides:

The court may treat as a nullity any motion which is (1) submitted primarily for
delay, or (2) submitted by an attorney who knows or should know that substantial
delay will result and that the motion if granted will secure very insubstantial relief. The court may impose disciplinary sanctions in an appropriate case.
Edestein, supra note 103, at 1079.
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obligation is imposed to make some inquiry into the factual support for the motion prior to filing. While the Judicial Conference
did not deem it necessary to adopt this restatement, simply adopting proposed rule 11 by reference, it is hoped that the amended
rule will draw attention to counsel's obligations, diminish if not
overcome judicial reluctance to impose sanctions, and thereby further deter dilatory abuse.134
IV. DIScOvERY ABUSE
A.

Excessive Demands and Stonewalling Counsel

Because an explosion of publicity ordinarily accompanies the
uncovering of fabrication or suppression of evidence, most of the
attention regarding misuse of litigation tactics has been focused on
discovery misconduct. 13 5 When Judge Charles Renfrew prepared
his seminal article on discovery sanctions," 6 he very properly singled out the Berkey Photo-EastmanKodak antitrust litigation for
purposes of illustration. 3 7 That case climaxed dramatically in the
institution of disciplinary proceedings against Wall Street attorneys who had secreted documents that their opponents had re131FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra
note 16, Rule 7; Edelstein, supra note 103, at 1079.
131See generally D. SEGAL, SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE ON DISCOVERY FROM 1970 TO THE

PRESENT: EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTIONS AND PROPOSED REFORMS 10-13 (1978); Brazil, supra

note 10, at 824-46. One commentator has stated that discovery today exhausts more time

than all other pretrial procedures combined and may make a lawyer's pretrial preparation
more difficult than the actual trial. McElroy, FederalPre-TrialProcedurein an Antitrust
Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 680-81 (1977). Courts must spend increasingly greater amounts of
time ruling on discovery motions. Id. at 681. McElroy calls for a "tightening of the free
discovery reins. . . at first informally, and perhaps in one federal jurisdiction at a time, and
then finally in some new formal expressions in amendments to the discovery rules." Id. The
Supreme Court has also recognized the potential for abuse of discovery procedures. Although the liberal discovery process is valuable to the extent it helps reveal the merits of
asserted claims,
to the extent that it permits a plaintiff with a largely groundless claim to simply
take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so representing
an in terrorem increment of the settlement value, rather than a reasonably
founded hope that the process will reveal relevant evidence, it is a social cost
rather than a benefit.
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975). Reasons given for widespread evasive practices are the desire to avoid disclosing potentially damaging information,
"to capitalize on an opponent's laziness" hoping he will not follow up, to "buy-time," and to
discourage additional suits by making the process costly and time consuming. Brazil, supra
note 10, at 836 (discussion of rule 37 sanctions).
136

See Renfrew, supra note 5.

137

See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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quested, while simultaneously representing to the court that the
materials had been discarded inadvertently.1 38 While the Kodak
case presented exceptional facts, Judge Renfrew's suggestion that
the case was not an isolated instance of abuse1 39 has been borne
out by several recent cases.
Penthouse International,Ltd. v. Playboy Enterprises,Inc.140
involved a letter sent by a Playboy employee to a number of advertising executives."" The letter erroneously reported that Penthouse had not met the minimum circulation figures certified to the
Audit Bureau of Circulations, an association of publishers and advertisers that audits its members' circulation claims. 142 Penthouse
brought an action for trade libel, seeking substantial damages for
lost advertising revenues attributable to the letter as well as for
corrective advertising.1 43 Playboy counterclaimed with charges of
unfair competition, challenged the lost revenue claims, and attempted to demonstrate that having enjoyed increased revenues,
Penthouse had spent additional sums for self-advertising as a matter of business judgment.14 4 Shortly after the litigation was commenced, Playboy served a document request demanding the production of all Penthouse estimates of anticipated advertising space
sales beginning in 1972.145 This request was followed by interrogatories which sought the identities of all parties claiming to have
refrained from advertising in Penthouse as a result of the letter.1 46
These interrogatories also contained demands for relevant schedules, charts, lists, and financial statements, as well as a renewed
1 47
request for projections of advertising sales.
138See Renfrew, supra note 5, at 265 (citing Kiechel, The Strange Case of Kodak's
Lawyers, FORTUNE, May 8, 1978, at 188).
,31Renfrew, supra note 5, at 265.
140 86 F.R.D. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 663 F.2d 371 (2d Cir. 1981).
141 86 F.R.D. at 397.
142 Penthouse Int'l, Ltd. v. Playboy Enters., Inc., 392 F. Supp. 257, 259-60 (S.D.N.Y.
1974). The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary order enjoining the defendants from continuing allegedly libelous conduct was heard in 1974, id. at 258, but was denied, id. at 262.
14386 F.R.D. at 397.
144 Id.
145 Id.

at 397.

at 398. Playboy's document request called for production of "[p]rojections or
estimates" of Penthouse's "anticipated advertising space sales" for all editions from January, 1972 to the date of the request. Id. In earlier depositions both the publisher and a vicepresident of Penthouse testifed to the existence of the projections. Id. The chief operations
officer, however, stated that advertising projections did not exist. Id.
"46 Id.
147 Id. at 399. Penthouse objected to each of Playboy's document requests stating that
lost advertising revenues would not be proven through "specific accounts," id. at 398, and
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Although several Penthouse employees, including its chief executive officer, had previously testified in depositions as to the existence of advertising projections, Penthouse did not produce the
requested information. 4 8 Instead, it embarked upon a course of
obstruction "accompanied by subterfuge, misrepresentation and
false testimony.1 49 Specifically, Penthouse and its counsel failed
to produce the estimates that were readily available,' 50 and despite
an order requiring them to respond to the interrogatories, failed to
comply until sanctions had been imposed.' 5' Subsequently, in response to the interrogatories requesting the identification of advertisers who allegedly had been influenced by the libelous letter,
Penthouse stated that it had no intention of demonstrating advertising revenues by identifying particular accounts, 152 and, furtherthat the requested documents contained trade secrets and fell "within the attorney's workproduct privilege," id. at 399.
148

Id. at 398; see note 145 supra.

14986

F.R.D. at 406.
See id. at 401. At trial, Penthouse's attorney, publisher, controller, and accountant
all testified that no written projections of advertising revenues had ever existed. Id. at 40001. At a later hearing, Penthouse's attorney stated that a further search for the documents
had been made, uncovering the allegedly nonexistent projections. Id. at 401.
11 Id. at 398. Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides in part:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully
alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential
evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to
do any such act...
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except
for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists;
(d) in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request, or fail to
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party ....
FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.4; cf. Chapman v. Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co., 613 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir. 1980) (attorney held in criminal contempt for failure to
submit written narratives of witnesses' testimony as ordered in a pretrial conference); Cine
Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir.
1979) (sanctions imposed because of inexcusable delays in responding to discovery requests
due to counsel's "gross professional negligence"). The Supreme Court has also examined
possible sanctions to impose on attorneys who unreasonably extend court proceedings. See
Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 757-64 (1980). In Roadway, the Court stated:
Due to sloth, inattention, or desire to seize tactical advantage, lawyers have long
indulged in dilatory practices. A number of factors legitimately may lengthen a
lawsuit and the parties themselves may cause some of the delays. Nevertheless,
many actions are extended unnecessarily by lawyers who exploit or abuse judicial
procedures, especially the liberal rules for pretrial discovery.
Id. at 757 n.4 (citations omitted). See also Brazil, supra note 10, at 858 (tactical reasons
exist for abuses of discovery).
"5

182

86 F.R.D. at 398.
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more, never appeared at a hearing scheduled to examine the adequacy of its responses. 153 Although Penthouse initially contended
that the information sought was privileged, 1 " it subsequently informed the trial judge that the projections had never existed. 155
Before doing so, however, Penthouse attempted to justify its nonproduction through the assertion of claims that the renewed request was untimely and that, in any event, the estimates had not
been "approved" and thus were not within the scope of the document request.1 5 ' Concluding that Penthouse and its counsel
,11Id. The court imposed costs of $150 on Penthouse because of its failure to appear at
a hearing. Id. In Sanchez v. Phillips, 46 Ill. App. 3d 430, 361 N.E.2d 36 (App. Ct. 1977), a
default judgment was entered against the defendants after their attorney had failed to appear at a motion hearing on the plaintiff's motion to strike the defendant's answer for previous failures to appear. Id. at 432, 361 N.E.2d at 38. The court stated that "an attorney has a
duty to zealously represent a client in accord with the code of professional ethics." Id. at
434, 361 N.E.2d at 40.
'5
86 F.R.D. at 405. Penthouse referred to the requested documents as "highly sensitive, confidential, commercial information and trade secrets." Id. at 399. Parties may be
granted an order protecting such confidential material where the court is convinced that the
desirability of maintaining the secrecy of certain research outweighs the need for discovery.
4 J. MOORE, supra note 2, 26.75. However, "no absolute privilege... protects such information." Id. Regardless of whether there is a trade secret issue, interrogatories must be
answered. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 23 F.R.D. 1, 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). See also
Ohio v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 570 F.2d 1370, 1374 (10th Cir. 1978) (court has no need to
determine or apply foreign secrecy laws, calling defendant's claim with reference to Swiss
secrecy laws "no more than diversionary tactics"); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 72
F.R.D. 116, 122 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (although 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976) prohibits certain disclosures of adverse information in a consumer report, discovery of such information is not prohibited as 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(1) provides for disclosure "[iln response to the order of a court
having jurisdiction to issue such an order").
'5586 F.R.D. at 405. The court stated that Penthouse's attorney had made willful misrepresentations to the court. Id. at 406. "[A]t the very least he was making representations
to the court which he knew he had no basis to make. However, the strong probability is that
[he] knew at least in a general way of the existence of the advertising projections and nevertheless stated that there were no such projections." Id. The Penthouse attorney's conduct
specifically is proscribed by the comment to model rule 3.3:
[A]n assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as in an affidavit
by the lawyer or in a statement in open court, may properly be made only when
the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a
reasonably diligent inquiry.
FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RuLEs, supra note 13, Rule 3.3 comment.
58 86 F.R.D. at 404-05. It is not uncommon for a party initially to deny that documents
exist, and later attempt to advance strained construction of the language of the document
request or court order requiring production. See, e.g., G-K Properties v. Redevelopment
Agency, 577 F.2d 645, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1978). One commentator lists "standard devices"
used to resist discovery.
(1) Constru[ing] all inquiries and requests as narrowly as possible, thereby limiting the amount of useful information that must be divulged;
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flagrantly had violated the discovery rules throughout the entire
157
litigation, the trial judge dismissed the complaint.
In Litton Systems v. AT&T,15 8 Litton charged AT&T and its
affiliates with violating the antitrust laws by monopolizing the sale
and leasing of telephone terminal equipment. 59 By way of defense,
AT&T alleged that Litton's telephone subsidiary went out of business due to mismanagement, incompetence, and dishonesty.0 0 To
establish its claims, AT&T sought the production of records of interviews conducted by Litton's house counsel with various Litton
employees regarding financial improprieties in the operation of the
company."' Litton's trial counsel initially maintained that no such
records existed other than notes of interviews with five persons
under indictment for bribery. 18 2 In fact, however, Litton's files contained handwritten notes of interviews with other employees relating to "skimming" and payment of "finder's fees. 16 3 After discovering these additional notes, trial counsel failed to correct their
prior misstatement and furnished copies of the notes of the interviews with the five indictees without the intervening pages con(2) refus[ing] to respond to written requests that are not free of virtually all ambi-

guity, imprecision, overbreadth, irrelevance, or other technical deficiency;
(3) scrutiniz[ing] every probe from an adversary to determine whether it is directed at material that is arguably shielded from disclosure [by privilege or the
work product doctrine];
(4) burying significant documents in mounds of irrelevant or innocuous materials;
and
(5) refus[ing] to respond to interrogatories or document production requests until
compelled to do so.
Brazil, The Adversary Characterof Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposalfor Change,
31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1323-25 (1978); see Brazil, supra note 10, at 829.
Apart from the growing willingness of trial judges to impose money sanctions on attorneys that engage in such practices, there are also malpractice ramifications of such conduct.
See Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 536 F.2d 730, 733-34 (7th Cir. 1976)
(conduct of counsel during discovery which causes ill will and deprives insured of opportunity to settle states a cause of action for malpractice). See also Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger &
Carr, An Up-Date on Rule 37 Sanctions After National Hockey League v. Metropolitan
Hockey Clubs, Inc., 3 AM. J. TRiAL ADvoc. 413, 447 (1980).
5

86 F.R.D. at 406-07.

:58 90

F.R.D. 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
:9 Id. at 413.
160 Id.
:61 Id. at 414.
,:2 Id.

I Id. at 414-15.

CURBING LITIGATION ABUSES

1982]

taining the additional interviews.'6 Indeed, counsel represented
that the omitted pages contained information wholly extraneous to
the case. 165 Notwithstanding his conclusion that the defendants
were not prejudiced to any significant extent, the trial judge ruled
that the gross negligence and willful misconduct of Litton's house
and trial counsel warranted substantial sanctions. "6' Although the
trial judge refused to set aside a substantial jury verdict in favor of
Litton, the court denied Litton costs and attorney's fees which
would have "run well into the eight-figure range. ' 7
These examples of unjustified resistance to legitimate discovery requests reflect only one aspect of discovery abuse. Other widespread abuses include engaging in "fishing expeditions," delaying
the completion of discovery, and forcing opposing counsel to incur
unnecessary expenses by requesting inordinately large numbers of
documents, producing requested documents in large, unorganized
lots, or serving overly extensive interrogatories. For example, in In
re U.S. Financial Securities Litigation,'6" the defendant served
the plaintiffs with interrogatories containing 2,736 questions that
would have cost an estimated $24,000 to answer. 6" Similarly, in
Barouh Eaton Allen Corp. v. IBM,170 the trial court vacated 200
interrogatories that had been served by IBM almost simultaneously with notices of dispositions through which identical information could have been obtained."" In addition, the trial judge imposed a $1,000 sanction upon IBM's attorneys which was to be
17 2
paid by them personally prior to any further discovery.
"S

Id. at 417-18.

:65 Id. at 418.
" Id. at 420-21; see Litton Syss., Inc. v. AT&T, 91 F.R.D. 574, 578 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (on
reconsideration). When the court heard the discovery motion, the trial of the case already
had proceeded for nearly 5 months. 90 F.R.D. at 421. Imposition of sanctions, therefore, was
postponed "because of the risk that the lengthy ordeal [of trial] would have to be repeated,
for example, if the Court of Appeals should reverse this Court's findings and conclusions as
to the misconduct of the plaintiff's counsel or should disagree as to the sanctions imposed."
Id.

91 F.R.D. at 578.
1- 74 F.R.D. 497 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
16

169 Id. at 497-98.

170 76 App. Div. 2d 873, 429 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1980).
17

Id. at 874, 429 N.Y.S.2d at 35.

172 Id.
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B. The Attorney's New Ethical Duties Under the Proposed
Model Rules
In response to the growing body of literature calling for discovery reform, the drafters of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct have proposed a rule that has no counterpart in the current ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility. Model rule
3.4(d) prohibits an attorney from making frivolous discovery requests.17 - Moreover, under rule 3.4(d), a reasonably diligent effort
must be made to comply with proper discovery requests.17 4 Accord-

ing to the notes accompanying the 1981 draft of the proposed rule,
the intent was to incorporate into the rule governing discovery
practices the same objective standard adopted in rule 3.1 to regulate other abuses.17 5 This proposal is in accord with the Supreme

Court decisions in National Hockey League v. MetropolitanHockey Club, Inc., 6 and Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper.17 7 National
Hockey League involved the dismissal of a multidistrict antitrust
suit after plaintiff's counsel callously disregarded their responsibility to answer interrogatories. 78 Although the Third Circuit reversed on the basis of an absence of bad faith,17 9 the Supreme
Court reinstated the dismissal, noting that severe sanctions are
"73 See FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.4 comment. For attorneys'
interpretations of the "prevailing ethic," see Brazil, supra note 10, at 836, 838.
174 See FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.4(d).
171 1981 DarA
OF MODEL RULES, supra note 55, Rule 3.4 comment.

.76
77
78

427 U.S. 639 (1976).
447 U.S. 752 (1980).

427 U.S. at 643. The district court imposed the sanction of dismissal against the
Metropolitan Hockey Club, pursuant to Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for
failure to comply with a discovery order. Id. at 640-41. Rule 37 grants trial courts the power
to enforce compliance with the rules of discovery, provided the court exercises reasonable
discretion as to the alternative sanctions. FED. R. Civ. P. 37. Accordingly, rule 37(b)(2)(C)
provides:
If a party... fails to obey an order to provide or permit discovery. . . the court
in which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to the failure as
are just, and among others the following:
(C) An order. . . dismissing the action or proceeding or any part thereof.
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C). Thus, in finding that Metropolitan unjustifiably resisted discovery by failing to answer crucial interrogatories, the trial court held that dismissal was warranted. 427 U.S. at 641 (citing In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litig., 63 F.R.D. 641, 656
(E.D. Pa. 1974)).
17 427 U.S. at 641. Noting that Metropolitan's untimely answer to interrogatories was
not willful, the court of appeals concluded that the sanction of dismissal was improper. Id.
(citing In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litig., 531 F.2d 1188, 1195 (3d Cir. 1976)). Moreover, the court of appeals indicated that the record contained evidence of extenuating factors which would militate in favor of a less severe sanction. 427 U.S. at 641.
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necessary to deter other litigants who otherwise might be tempted
to flout discovery orders. 180 The deterrent rationale was reemphasized in Roadway Express, in which the Court held that an attorney, as well as a party litigant, may be held liable for the expenses
and attorney's fees resulting from failure to comply with a discovery order.18 ' The emerging deterrence orientation has led some
180 427 U.S. at 643. The NationalHockey League Court adhered to its prior decision in
Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958),
which ruled that bad faith is a prerequisite for dismissal under rule 37(b), id. at 212. See
427 U.S. at 640. While a case may not be dismissed, absent willfulness, for failure to comply
with a discovery order, a showing of willfulness is unnecessary under rule 37(b). 357 U.S. at
207-08. Emphasizing the trial court's discretion in imposing sanctions, the National Hockey
League Court reasoned that the district judge did not abuse his discretion by ordering dismissal under the factual circumstances. 427 U.S. at 643. Notably, the Court stated:
[T]he most severe in the spectrum of sanctions provided by statute or rule must
be available to the district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those
whose conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who
might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.
Id.
181 447 U.S. at 763-64. The respondents in Roadway Express filed a civil rights class
action in federal district court alleging employment discrimination. Id. at 754. Pursuant to
Roadway's motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, the district court dismissed the
action without reaching the merits, due to the respondents' attorneys' misconduct. Id. at
755. The attorneys' misconduct included a failure to comply with a court discovery order, a
failure to file a court-ordered brief and other "deliberate inaction" in handling the case. Id.
(quoting Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 411, 417 (W.D. La. 1977), vacated and
remanded, 599 F.2d 1378 (5th Cir. 1979), rev'd in part sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v.
Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980)). Relying on section 1927 of title 28, the court assessed the respondents' attorneys personally for petitioner's court costs and attorney's fees. 73 F.R.D. at
415, 417. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's findings that the attorneys had increased the costs in the suit by their "unreasonable and vexatious multiplication
of the proceedings." Monk v. Roadway Express, Inc., 599 F.2d 1378, 1381 (5th Cir. 1979),
rev'd in part sub nom. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752 (1980). Although the
court of appeals concluded that the attorneys' actions justified the imposition of sanctions,
the court nevertheless held that section 1927 did not authorize the award of attorney's fees.
599 F.2d at 1382-83. Despite its observation that section 1927 provides only for excessive
costs, not attorney's fees, caused by the respondents' vexatious behavior, the Supreme Court
held that the federal court had inherent authority to assess the opposing party's attorney's
fees against an attorney for unreasonable conduct during the litigation. 447 U.S. at 765. In
reaching this conclusion, the Roadway Express Court focused on the federal court's inherent power to protect the orderly administration of justice which allows the court to impose
sanctions to deter abusive litigation. Id. (citing Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 632
(1962)). Furthermore, the Court noted an exception to the general rule that a litigant cannot
recover his attorney's fees. 447 U.S. at 765. Through its inherent equitable power, a federal
court may award fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith. Id. at 765-66. The Court
extended this bad faith exception to encompass attorneys, reasoning that "[i]f a court may
tax counsel fees against a party who has litigated in bad faith, it certainly may assess those
expenses against counsel who willfully abuse judicial processes." Id. at 766. Thus, an award
of fees against an attorney effectively will deter the abusive litigation and concomitantly
ensure the orderly administration of justice. This is especially true since most court orders
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commentators to advocate the imposition of severe sanctions even
when noncompliance is unintentional.182
Unfortunately, it is more difficult to regulate excessive discovery than it is to deter unjustified resistance to discovery.""' In addition to perennial recommendations that a stricter relevance standard be incorporated into the rules, 84 or that depositions and
expressly preclude indemnity from counsel's client. See, e.g., Associated Radio Serv. Co. v.
Page Airways, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 218, 220 (N.D. Tex. 1977).
112 Note, Discovery Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: A GoalOriented Mission for Rule 37, 29 CASE W. RES. 603, 627-30 (1979); Comment, Preventing
Abuse of Discovery in Federal Courts, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 273, 303-05 (1981). Acknowledging a majority trend to impose sanctions for an unintentional or negligent failure to comply
with a court's discovery order, several commentators have cautioned against such an extension, contending that ultimate sanctions should be imposed only where there is a showing of
willfulness. See Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr, supra note 156, at 443-44; Note, The
Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1033, 1049-51 (1978); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:Defining a Feasible Culpability Threshold for the Imposition of Severe Discovery Sanctions, 65 MINN. L. REV. 137
(1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Defining a Feasible Culpability Threshold]. Despite such
caution, some courts have concluded that gross negligence also should be subject to the
severe sanctions imposed by Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Cine FortySecond St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1067-68 (2d Cir.
1979). Emphasizing the deterrence policy articulated in National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639 (1976), the Cine court reasoned that "[n]egligent, no less
than intentional, wrongs are fit subjects for general deterrence." 602 F.2d at 1067. Notably,
the concurrence recognized that precautionary measures embodying a concern for the innocent client are necessary. Consequently, the concurrence observed, a trial judge should not
impose harsh sanctions upon a client, absent the client's "knowledge, condonation, compliance, or causation" in the attorney's misconduct. Id. at 1068-69 (Oakes, J., concurring).
"I3
See Krupp, Rule 37; Sanctions for Discovery Resistance, 7 LITIGATION 32, 60
(Spring 1981). Krupp noted the difficulty inherent in providing clear-cut sanctions to control excessive discovery:
It is exceedingly difficult to legislate or make effective rules against overkill. Who
is to say that two dispositions or ten are excessive in the context of a given action?
A case involving a relatively small amount may be very important to either of the
parties because of its potential as precedent.
Id. Subsequently, an advisory committee was appointed and ultimately proposed some reform in the sanctions available to combat excessive discovery. For an excellent discussion of
the various proposals, their scope and drawbacks, see Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery
Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597, 597-603. Apparently, the advisory committee did not adequately address the corrective measures necessary
to proscribe the problem of excessive use of discovery. See Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 85 F.R.D. 521, 522-23, 526-27, 541-44 (1980).
184 See D. SEGAL, supra note 135, at 17-20. Proposed by the Special Committee for the
Study of Discovery Abuse of the American Bar Association, the suggested amendment to
rule 26(b)(1) contains a discovery standard of relevance "to the issues raised by the claims
or defenses of any party." Id. Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure currently provides a standard of relevance "to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim
or defense of any other party. . .." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). The phrase "relevant to the
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interrogatories be limited to an arbitrary number absent a showing
of good cause, 18 5 recent proposals have emphasized both a greater
role for the court in expediting discovery 88 and a preventive rather
than a wholly sanction-oriented approach to the problem of exces7
sive discovery.

8

subject matter involved in the pending action" has been construed to encompass "any matter that bears on, or that could lead to other matter that bears on, any issue that is or may
be in the case." Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (citation
omitted).
285 See D. SEGAL, supra note 135, at 49-50. Recognizing that reforms to limit the number of interrogatories a party may serve during discovery have not undergone much scrutiny, the advisory committee suggested that a limitation be imposed on the number of discretionary intbrrogatories within each district, rather than fix a threshold limitation. Id. at
50. Notably, this approach has been adopted by the local rules of several federal districts.
See, e.g., Flegal & Umin, supra note 183, at 606 n.30. Typically, these rules provide:
No party shall serve on any other party more than twenty (20) interrogatories in
the aggregate without leave of court. Subparagraphs of any interrogatory shall relate directly to the subject matter of the interrogatory. Any party desiring to serve
additional interrogatories shall file a written motion setting forth the proposed
additional interrogatories and the reasons establishing good cause for their use.
N.D. ILL. R. 9(g). Although many jurisdictions have been receptive to this approach, other
jurisdictions have opposed any limitation on the number of interrogatories as "unworkable."
D. SEGAL, supra note 135, at 50 & n.140; cf. Bogorad, The Impact of the Amended Rules
Upon Discovery PracticeBefore the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 66 TRADE-mARK
REP. 28, 38 (1976) (trademark board eliminated the practice of limiting the number of interrogatories due to influx of motions for additional interrogatories and attorney ingenuity in
circumventing the rule).
18 See Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The ContinuingNeed
for an Umpire, 31 SYRAcusE L. REv. 543, 562 (1980). Observing the trial confusion engendered by the pattern of minimal judicial involvement during discovery, as designed by federal rules, id. at 555-60, Professor Nordenberg opined that "[s]upervision and guidance from
the court is, again, the only answer [for the proper management of discovery]." Id. at 562.
Alternatively, a court-appointed referee to oversee the discovery may be required to reduce,
yet not eliminate, court supervision. See Park-Tower Dev. Group, Inc. v. Goldfeld, 87 F.R.D.
96, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("[i]t would be wholly unwarranted for any judge or magistrate to set
aside the time that would be required to deal with [excessive discovery] .... We feel that
the Special Master ... be put in charge [to supervise discovery]"); see also Eggleston v.
Chicago Journeymen Plumbers Local 130, 657 F.2d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 1981) (where questioning by counsel was "excessive, burdensome, unnecessary and intrusive ... [the court] recommended the appointment of a special master ... to expedite further discovery").
'57 See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 643
(1976). In determining that an attorney's failure to comply with a court order to answer
interrogatories justified dismissal of the action, the National Hockey League Court stressed
the deterrent function of rule 37 sanctions. Id. at 642-43. Significantly, National Hockey
League was the first case to interpret the rule 37 sanctions and thereby set the stage for the
subsequent influx of decisions geared toward this preventive approach accorded the problem
of excessive discovery. See Epstein, Corcoran, Krieger & Carr, supra note 156, at 418-43.
One commentator notes that both an increased judicial role in discovery and a greater willingness to impose the sanctions have contributed to the current shift toward preventive
discovery. See Pope, Rule 34: Controlling the Paper Avalanche, 7 LMGATION 28, 57-58
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C. Judicial Intervention Through Federal Rule 26
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) currently provides for a
discovery conference to be held on the motion of a party, or, when
deemed necessary, by the court on its own motion.""8 The motion
must certify that counsel has made a "reasonable effort to reach
agreement with opposing attorneys" and must provide a statement
of the issues, a proposed discovery plan and schedule, and any proposed limitations on the discovery process.189 After the discovery
conference, the court is required to identify the issues on which
discovery may be had and establish any other limitations on the
scope, timing or method of discovery.190 To assure counsel's cooperation in framing this discovery order, rule 37 was simultaneously
amended to enable the court to require that a party or his attorney
pay the reasonable expenses and attorney's fees resulting from his
failure "to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
'
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f)."19
The efficacy of rule 26(f) is discussed in the American College
of Trial Lawyers' recommendations,192 which concludes that it
(Spring 1981).
18 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). The court may combine a discovery conference with the discretionary pretrial conference under rule 16, id., thereby encouraging the identification of issues before discovery begins. Accordingly, the advisory committee proposed that rule 16 be
amended to include a mandatory scheduling conference, an expansion of the list of subjects
to be discussed at pretrial, a settlement conference, the use of pretrial procedures to expedite discovery, the issuance of binding pretrial orders and the imposition of sanctions for
failure to comply with the rule. 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 16, Rule 16 advisory committee note, at 14-22. See also Brazil,
Improving Judicial Controls Over the PretrialDevelopment of Civil Actions: Model Rules
for Case Management and Sanctions, 1981 AM. B. FOUNDATION RESEARCH J. 875, 916-36
(recommending further proposals to amend rule 16).
189 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1)-(5). Rule 26(f) imposes a good faith duty on each party and
his attorney to participate in framing a discovery plan. Id. 26(f)(5).
I9 Id. 26(f).
191Id. 37(g).
192 Recommendations of the American College of Trial Lawyers on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 207, 221-25 (1981). Rule 26(f) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure is designed to promote the efficiency of the pretrial discovery process by
narrowing and simplifying the issues for trial, through stipulations of uncontroverted facts
and reduction of unnecessary discovery. Id. at 222; see, e.g., United States v. Cox, 664 F.2d
257, 259 (11th Cir. 1981) (appellant was given detailed list of items constituting converted
property at pretrial discovery conferences); cf. United States v. Arcentales, 532 F.2d 1046,
1047 & n.4 (5th Cir. 1976) (pretrial discovery conference held pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 16). Discovery would then be limited to the issues agreed upon by the
parties. See 90 F.R.D. at 222. The discovery process, however, would not be static. Discovery
could be broadened or narrowed after a conference had taken place upon a showing to the
court that there was a justification for doing so. Id. at 222-23.
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functions as a valuable mechanism for avoiding the weaknesses inherent in the traditional "protective order" system by allowing the
court to compel the litigant to state the issues, to "limit discovery
to those issues," to discern those that are dispositive of the case,
and to permit discovery regarding them. 193 The advisory committee recommended that the discovery conference be supplemented
with substantial amendments to rule 26.1H Proposed rule 26(b)
provides the court with the authority to limit the use of discovery
if
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cummulative [sic] or duplicative, or obtainable from some other source that is either
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery
in the action to obtain the information sought; or (iii) the discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the
case, the amount in controversy, limitations on the the parties'
resources, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. The court may act upon its own initiative after reasonable
notice pursuant to a motion under subdivision (c). 195
The Control Data case19 6 demonstrates that judicial intervention
19390 F.R.D. at 217-19. Local rules and practices have been promulgated in an effort to
reduce discovery abuse. See Note, Recent Trends in the Enforcement of Discovery: Sanctions in the Federal Courts and in Illinois, 11 Loy. U. Ci. L.J. 773, 790 (1980). Some of
these rules deal with the trial court's use of a pretrial discovery conference. See, e.g., M.D.
N.C. R. 22; N.D. Omo R. 2(a)(6); E.D. PA. R. 7. These local rules have been upheld where
they are deemed consistent with the intent of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Beer
Nuts, Inc. v. King Nut Co., 477 F.2d 326, 329-30 (6th Cir. 1973). Where, howevei, they
require a virtual trial on the merits, the local rules have been struck down. See McCargo v.
Hendrick, 545 F.2d 393, 402 (4th Cir. 1976). Fundamentally, the problem with the
nonuniform rules was that they tended to place too great a burden on attorneys and circumvent the simple procedures envisioned by Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
See Note, Pretrial Conference: A CriticalExamination of Local Rules Adopted by Federal
District Courts, 64 VA. L. REv. 467, 474-75 (1978).
14 90 F.R.D. at 217.

195FINAL DRAT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RuLEs OF CIVM PROCEDURE, supra

note 16, Rule 26(b)(1). Discovery may be abused in two different ways. It may be overbroad,
see Schroeder & Frank, The Proposed Changes in the Discovery Rules, 1978 ARuz. ST. L.J.
475, 476, or attorneys may engage in maneuvers to resist discovery, id. Either scheme results
in an increase in the time and cost of litigation. See id. at 478. Such exploitation of discovery works to the detriment of justice. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 179 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). Discovery thereby becomes a means of harassment, see Note, Excessive
Discovery in Federal and Illinois Courts: A Tool of Harassment and Delay?, 11 Loy. U.
CHI. L.J. 807, 807 (1980), and of eliciting an early settlement, id. at 811.
'I"Control Data Corp. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth., 87 F.R.D. 377
(D.D.C. 1980); see notes 104-107 and acompanying text supra.
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often is necessary to prevent counsel from engaging in "discovery
wars" or burying each other in "boilerplate," without furthering
any legitimate interest of either client. Proposed rule 26(b) would
provide the trial judge with the authority to limit or terminate cumulative or duplicative discovery, 197 as well as enable him to require the use of one discovery device rather than another.1 9 8 The
reported cases and commentary suggest that such a rule frequently
may be invoked to curb the abuses associated with oppressive or
duplicative interrogatories 99
Finally, the preventive approach toward the problem of excessive discovery embodied in rule 26(f) and proposed rule 26(b) does
not mean that the more objective standard of culpability advanced
in the model rules went unnoticed. Characterized by one commentator as the "Truth in Discovery Rule,"20 0 proposed rule 26(g)
mandates that every request, response or objection be signed individually by an attorney of record and contain his address. 20' In the
event a party is proceeding pro se, he must sign the request, objection, or response himself and give his address. 202 This signature
certifies that the request, response or objection is:
to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
a reasonable inquiry ... (1) consistent with these rules and warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law; (2) not interposed for
any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary
delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation; and (3) not
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs
of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in
controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation. 201

"I FINAL

DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

supra

note 16, Rule 26.
198Id.
'9 See In re U.S. Financial Sec. Litiga., 74 F.R.D. 497, 498 (S.D. Cal. 1975); Fishman v.
A.H. Riise Gift Shop, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 704, 705 (D.V.I. 1975); Boyden v. Troken, 60 F.R.D.
625, 626 (N.D. Ill. 1973); cf. Barough Eaton Allen Corp. v. IBM, 76 App. Div. 2d 873, 874,
429 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (2d Dep't 1980) (vacating interrogatories pursuant to New York counterpart to rule 26(b) is proper to prevent discovery abuse).

200 Rosenberg, supra note 17, at 9.
201 FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

supra

note 16, Rule 26(g).
202

Id.

Id. It is hoped that the added responsibility of certification will induce an attorney
to examine more carefully the factual basis of the intended discovery. This is deemed a rule
of "reasonable inquiry." See FINAL DRAFT OF MODEL RULES, supra note 13, Rule 3.3.
203

CURBING LITIGATION ABUSES

1982]

Unsigned requests, responses, or objections are deemed ineffective
and may be stricken. 04 Whenever certifications violative of proposed rule 26(g) are made, the court must impose appropriate
sanctions, which may include an assessment of reasonable expenses
and attorney's fees.20 5
This provision adopts an "objective" standard identical to that
advanced in the model rules and proposed rules 7 and 11.20 6 Like
these other rules, proposed rule 26(g) will "protect lawyers who
make honest errors of judgment while exercising the level of care
observed by reasonably competent and ethical lawyers [and lead]
attorneys to investigate a little more fully the claims that their clients want them to assert on their behalf."2 07
V.

CONCLUSION

Currently, pressure is being exerted on the legal profession to
adopt procedural and ethical reforms which would prohibit the institution of groundless lawsuits and the use of motion and discovery devices for purposes of delay. An increasing number of jurisdictions have abandoned or modified the traditional rule granting
trial counsel an absolute immunity from the claims of third-parties.20 8 Indeed, the proponents of the Model Rules of Professional
201 FINAL DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra

note 16, Rule 26(g).
20 Id. In an effort to curb the abuse of discovery, proposed rule 26(g) makes it
mandatory for courts to impose sanctions. 1981 DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE supra note 16, Rule 26(g) advisory committee note, at 28. The

court's general authorization to impose sanctions derives from Rule 37 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, and section 1927 of the United States Code. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1976);
FED. R. Civ. P. 37; see Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980); National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976); Martin v. Bell Helicopter Co., 85 F.R.D. 654, 661-62 (D. Colo. 1980). See generally Note, Sanctions Imposed
by Courts on Attorneys Who Abuse the JudicialProcess, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 619 (1977).
206

1981

DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE,

supra

note 16, advisory committee note, at 27.
207 Renfrew, supra note 5, at 274; accord Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied
Artists Pictures Corp., 602 F.2d 1062, 1068 (2d Cir. 1979); Affanato v. Merrill Bros., 547
F.2d 138, 141 (1st Cir. 1977) (counsel's conduct amounted to more than mere negligence).
See also Note, Defining a Feasible Culpability Threshold, supra note 182, at 157 (until
standard of culpability is clarified, courts will have difficulty justifying the imposition of
severe sanctions in all but the clearest cases of intentional abuse).
208E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 206(d) (Smith-Hurd 1968). Section 206(d) provides
in pertinent part:
At any time during the taking of the deposition, on motion of any party or of the
deponent and upon a showing that the examination is being conducted in bad
faith or in any manner that unreasonably annoys, embarrasses, or oppresses the
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Conduct have embraced the emerging standards of attorney
liability.
Although there is considerable doubt regarding whether the
model rules will gain the support of the bar, they have provided
secondary authority for the formulation of a more objective standard of culpability governing the imposition of discovery sanctions
in the federal courts.209 Moreover, the emphasis throughout the
model rules upon balancing the legitimate interests of the client
against the resultant delay has been carried forward in the proposed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 7, 11 and
26. By allowing trial judges to determine whether a litigant's legitimate nondelay interests outweigh the delay which would accompany the particular motion or request, these provisions should encourage trial judges to sanction errant counsel with greater
frequency and thus deter the abusive practices that, previously,
often went unpunished. In addition, the proposed amendments to
the federal rules would supplement this approach by encouraging
greater judicial participation in controlling the scope and timing of
permissible discovery.

ld.

deponent or party, the court may order that the examination cease forthwith or
may limit the scope and manner of taking the examination as provided by these
rules .... Upon the demand of the objecting party or deponent, the taking of the
deposition shall be suspended for the time necessary to present a motion for an
order. The court may require either party or the deponent to pay costs or
expenses.

I*2 See Renfrew, supra note 5, at 280-81 (use of the pretrial discovery conference will
decrease the possibility that discovery abuses will go undetected and therefore unpunished).
The proposed rules are also intended to provide the court with greater flexibility to impose
necessary sanctions by streamlining procedures for their imposition. See McKinstry, Civil
Discovery Reform, 14 FORUM 790, 800 (1979). Under rule 26(f), and the companion proposed
modification under rule 37(e), discovery abuses may now be dealt with summarily by imposing monetary sanctions. Id.

